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Abstract  
The information technology (IT) project risk management literature comprises two dominant 
but diverging bodies of knowledge: the normative and the experiential. We conducted a three-
step dialectical review of this literature with the aim of creating a bridging body of knowledge. In 
the first step, delineation, we synthesize the overarching variance and process explanations in 
each body of knowledge and motivate the examination of their divergences. In the second step, 
contrastation, we perform a dialectical interrogation of these bodies to articulate their key 
assumption-level tensions. We elaborate on the most prominent tension between the two bodies, 
namely, the relative performance of intuition and deliberate analysis for project risk assessment. 
In the third step, sublation, we propose a theoretical model that resolves this tension. Anchored 
in both bodies of knowledge and drawing from managerial decision-making research, the model 
proposes that the relative performance of intuition depends on characteristics of the IT project 
manager (project-specific expertise), the project (risks’ temporal complexity and risks’ structural 
complexity), and the project’s organizational environment (e.g., stakeholders’ involvement in risk 
management, methods-using pressures). Moreover, the model posits that project-specific 
expertise moderates all the other effects. Building on the bridging knowledge insights from this 
model, we discuss how researchers can design interventions to increase project managers’ use 
of deliberate analysis when it is expected to outperform intuition or to encourage reliance on 
intuition when it is likely to outperform deliberate analysis. 
  
 
 
Introduction 
A longstanding objective of information technology (IT) project risk management research has 
been to advance knowledge useful for developing risk management prescriptions to guide IT 
project managers (ITPMs) (e.g., Alter & Ginzberg, 1978; Boehm, 1989; Keil, Cule, Lyytinen, & 
Schmidt, 1998; Taylor, Artman, & Woelfer, 2012). Such attempts are motivated by the enduring 
issue of the low success rate of IT projects (Charette & Romero, 2015) and supported by studies 
that found that appropriate risk response enactment is conducive to project success (Barki, 
Rivard, & Talbot, 2001). The ultimate objective of this review is to stimulate future research that 
will advance this kind of knowledge. 
Currently, there are two key bodies of knowledge in this area. The first is normative 
knowledge, anchored in decision theory-based risk management (e.g., expected utility theory, 
von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). Normative knowledge is developed chiefly by academics 
and is disseminated to practitioners through formal prescriptions (Kutsch & Hall, 2010; Taylor, 
2006), which have received some empirical support for their effectiveness (e.g., Barki et al., 2001; 
Jiang & Klein, 2000; Wallace & Keil, 2004). Over the years, many prescriptions have been 
incorporated into project management training materials (e.g., PMBoK by PMI, 2013) and 
advanced in practitioner-oriented journals (e.g., Boehm, 1991; Nelson, 2007). 
The second knowledge base is experiential knowledge, which is created and held by ITPMs 
in their day-to-day experiences. This knowledge, ensuing from how risks are actually managed, 
is captured by academics who “search for sense in behavior” (March, 1978, p. 604). Studies on 
experiential knowledge are few but have gained growing attention in recent years (Kutsch & Hall, 
2010; Kutsch, Denyer, Hall, & Lee-Kelley, 2013). Here, researchers have drawn from theories 
such as prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) or the seminal works of scholars such as 
March (March, 1978; March & Shapira, 1987) and Simon (1972, 1987).  
 
 
Despite some similarities, the normative and experiential bodies of knowledge have differing 
conceptualizations of core constructs and of their relationships. Accordingly, they sometimes 
result in significantly contrary risk assessments (e.g., no risk vs. severe risk) and risk response 
plans (e.g., action vs. inaction) (Bannerman, 2008; Drummond, 1996; Taylor et al., 2012), which 
can have severe implications for the success of IT projects. Moreover, attempts to make ITPMs 
fully apply normative prescriptions are sometimes unsuccessful, as many ITPMs, although trained 
with such prescriptions, disengage from applying them (Kutsch & Hall, 2009) or might practice 
them in a decoupled fashion just to gain legitimacy (Mignerat & Rivard, 2012).  
Given such diverging views of risk management, most researchers have chosen one as the 
foundation for advancing risk management knowledge and deriving prescriptions, the majority 
drawing on normative knowledge. However, taking a side can lead to performance issues. 
Whereas overreliance on normative prescriptions can lead to IT project failures (Drummond, 
1996), relying exclusively on experiential knowledge can result in erroneous risk estimations 
(Kutsch & Maylor, 2011).  
Accordingly, some researchers have alluded to the possibility of a contingent performance 
for each knowledge type (e.g., Baskerville & Stage, 1996; Taylor, 2007; Taylor et al., 2012). For 
example, this can be achieved by capturing managerial intuitions at the beginning of a risk 
assessment effort and later using tool-based analytical risk assessments to complement intuitions 
(Baskerville & Stage, 1996). We suggest that this perspective would enable creating a new 
knowledge type, bridging knowledge, which has several merits. First, by adopting an initially 
neutral position on the gap between normative and experiential knowledge, it recognizes the need 
for future research to identify their relative performance (Taylor, 2005). Second, it provides a 
significant opportunity for theory building by considering the contingent relative performance of 
each approach (Taylor, 2007). Third, it can contribute back to practice by guiding researchers in 
developing new prescriptions of increased practical usefulness (e.g., Taylor et al., 2012). 
Nonetheless, coherent development of bridging knowledge has been lacking to date.  
 
 
In this review, we aim to stimulate research on developing bridging knowledge by providing 
a deep understanding of the normative and experiential bodies of knowledge and reconciling 
some of their key tensions. To this end, considering that generating such novel knowledge is a 
dialectical process (Nicolai & Seidl, 2010), we take a dialectical review approach comprising the 
three steps of delineation, contrastation, and sublation. This dialectical approach led us to 
propose a theoretical model of the relative performance of intuition and deliberate analysis for risk 
assessment. Anchored in the two bodies of knowledge drawing from the managerial decision-
making literature (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Salas, Rosen, & DiazGranados, 2010), the model 
postulates that the relative performance of intuition depends on ITPMs’ characteristics (project-
specific expertise), project characteristics (risks’ temporal complexity and risks’ structural 
complexity), and organizational characteristics (e.g., stakeholders’ involvement in risk 
management, methods-using pressures). The model also posits that project-specific expertise 
moderates all other proposed effects. 
We make three contributions to the IT project risk management literature. First, the 
delineation step adds to the scarce reviews in this area (e.g., Bannerman, 2008) by synthesizing 
both bodies of knowledge via discussing their core constructs and developing their overarching 
models and thus provides a solid foundation for future research. Second, the contrastation step 
adds to the ongoing discussions of risk management assumptions (de Bakker, Boonstra, & 
Wortmann, 2010; Kutsch & Hall, 2009; Taylor et al., 2012) by bringing systematicity and structure 
to the articulation of the assumptions specific to each knowledge type and thus identifying a 
dominant assumption. Third, the sublation step adds to the rare studies that allude to contingent 
performance for each knowledge type (e.g., Taylor, 2007) by offering a new theoretical model of 
the relative performance of intuition. Overall, as we embark on the need for more bridging 
research (research that addresses current knowledge tensions without assuming either side as 
universally better), we expand—not simply extend—the calls for more normative (e.g., Sauer, 
 
 
Gemino, & Reich, 2008; Schmidt, Lyytinen, Keil, & Cule, 2001) or experiential (Kutsch et al., 2013; 
Lauer, 1996) research. 
We also contribute to methodology by offering a three-step dialectical review approach of 
two contrasting bodies of knowledge. Particularly, in the contrastation step, we contribute to 
research that examines alternative conceptual assumptions (e.g., Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011; 
Davis, 1971) by introducing a coherent approach that adapts the grounded theory literature review 
method (Wolfswinkel, Furtmueller, & Wilderom, 2013) and treats papers as data, the 
manifestations of assumptions in papers as open codes, and the articulated assumptions as 
axial/selective codes. 
We begin this paper by explaining in more detail our three-step dialectical approach.  
2. Review Approach 
Figure 1 shows our dialectical review approach. We defined a review protocol and then took the 
three consecutive steps of delineation, contrastation, and sublation. Each step of this process is 
explained below. 
2.1 Review Protocol 
We used a review protocol to conduct a systematic literature review (Boell & Kecmanovic, 2015). 
We searched online databases (Business Source Complete on EBSCOHost and ABI/INFORM 
on ProQuest) for the term “risk” in the titles and abstracts of articles published during 1990-2016 
in the AIS Senior Scholars’ basket of 8 journals. For an initial screening, we examined the 
abstracts to verify relevance and kept only peer-reviewed papers. For each retained paper, we 
next searched forward and backward (Webster & Watson, 2002), expanding our initial set of 
journals. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – A Three-step Dialectical Review Approach 
 
 
This resulted in identifying 268 papers (Table 1). We then read the abstracts, introductions, and 
conclusions of these papers and included those that focused on: (1) ITPMs, as they have risk 
management as part of their function (PMI, 2013); (2) in-house—not outsourced—IT projects, to 
limit the variation on the nature of risk management and the role of ITPMs; and (3) project risks, 
but not the financial risks of investing in a project (e.g., Dewan, Shi, & Gurbaxani, 2007) or the 
business risks of the delivered system, to focus on the risks that are more likely to be under the 
control of ITPMs. This yielded 137 papers.  
 
Table 1 ⎼ The Composition of the Pool of Papers in Terms of Publication Outlets 
Source 
Papers Identified 
in the Initial 
Keyword Search 
Papers Retained 
after Applying the 
Inclusion/ 
Exclusion Criteria 
Papers Kept 
Journals in the AIS basket of 8 64 28 28 
European Journal of Information Systems 9 5 5 
Information Systems Journal 6 3 3 
Information Systems Research 3 2 2 
Journal of Information Technology 17 10 10 
Journal of Management Information Systems 13 5 5 
Journal of Strategic Information Systems 2 0 0 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 2 2 2 
MIS Quarterly 12 1 1 
Other journals with > 4 papers initially identified  121 71 35 
Communications of the ACM 14 7 5 
Communications of the AIS 5 4 2 
IEEE Software 28 19 7 
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 11 3 0 
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 10 3 1 
Information & Management 6 4 3 
International Journal of Project Management 11 7 6 
Journal of Systems and Software 25 16 7 
Project Management Journal 11 8 4 
Other publication outlets 83 38 17 
Total 268 137 80 
Because the papers pertaining to the normative body of knowledge dominated this pool, we 
used practical screening (Okoli, 2015) and balanced the number of papers from each type of 
knowledge to enable creating dialectical forces of comparable size. We labeled each paper either 
“normative” or “experiential” on the basis of the knowledge type most pronounced in it. When both 
types were significantly discussed (e.g., Lyytinen, Mathiassen, & Ropponen, 1998), we labeled 
the paper “mixed” (see Appendix A for the coding scheme). Among the 137 papers, 88 (64%) 
 
 
related to normative knowledge, 18 (13%) were mixed, and 31 (23%) related to experiential 
knowledge. We kept all 31 papers with an experiential label, all 18 that were mixed, and the top 
31 influential studies with a normative label (using their Google Scholar citation count as of 
October 2016), retaining 80 papers in total. Although we distinguished the two knowledge types 
at the paper-level to create a manageable pool, our level of analysis was an excerpt within a 
paper. 
2.2 Delineation  
The delineation step consisted of a theme-based literature review (Webster & Watson, 2002) 
addressing the question of what each body of knowledge yielded. This involved a concept-centric 
synthesis that identified and defined the core constructs in each body of knowledge and two effect-
centric syntheses that integrated key variance and process relationships. To manage the logistics 
of this analysis, we imported the papers as data sources in NVivo 11 and coded their constructs 
and relationships. In addition to delineating each body of knowledge, this step implied the 
existence of some dialectical tensions. 
2.2 Contrastation  
The contrastation step involved articulating dialectical tensions within the pool of papers. Because 
tensions refer to dichotomies or inconsistencies that appear to originate from contradictory 
extremes (Bartunek & Rynes, 2014), the two bodies of knowledge were analyzed to identify pairs 
of divergent assumptions about a key risk management theme. This focus on assumptions has 
two motivations. First, it has been suggested that awareness of normative assumptions is crucial 
to understanding why prescriptions from the normative body of knowledge are sometimes difficult 
to apply in actual IT projects (Taylor et al., 2012). Second, such assumptions are insufficient for 
building further reconciling theories that go beyond the normative view and span the experiential 
knowledge domain.  
 
 
To identify tensions, we conducted dialectical interrogation (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011), 
which involved reading the papers in depth and iteratively comparing each unit of meaning about 
risk management in them with other relevant excerpts to allow the emergence of tensions. Our 
analysis was based on the premise that an assumption can have multiple manifestations, i.e., it 
is stated in different but essentially related ways. Also, we considered that whereas in some 
papers the manifestations are empirically evidenced, in others they are taken for granted as true. 
Moreover, we considered that while sometimes such manifestations are explicitly visible in the 
excerpts, often they are implicit. For example, a manifestation that we discussed is: “Deliberate 
analysis increases the accuracy of risk estimates”. It is explicit in the statement that research on 
risk assessment tools holds “the assumption that the use of such devices will lead to more 
accurate risk perceptions” (Keil, Wallace, Turk, Dixon-Randall, & Nulden, 2000, p. 145); however, 
it is implicit in the argument that “[w]ith a risk factor checklist, project managers can avoid 
overlooking some risk factors” (Schmidt et al., 2001, p. 8).  
To ensure consistency, we used the coding techniques of grounded theory applied to 
literature reviews (Wolfswinkel et al., 2013). With the papers imported in NVivo 11, we conducted 
open, axial, and selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In open coding, we coded any 
potential manifestations in the papers. Here, we created and used some initial codes from the 
literature on risk management assumptions inside (e.g., de Bakker et al., 2010; Kutsch & Hall, 
2009) and outside IS (e.g., March & Shapira, 1987) (see Appendix D). During axial coding, we 
articulated many tensions around themes about which we had coded several opposing 
experiential and normative manifestations, and then transformed the commonality of each 
experiential and normative group of manifestations into a more abstract assumption. Finally, in 
selective coding, we purified the tensions and merged some of them in a manageable way. One 
author coded the entire pool; the other verified 10% of the codes for each manifestation. The few 
discrepancies were discussed until resolved, and the outcomes of this resolution were applied to 
the rest of the sample. We coded all 80 articles, although we reached saturation after analyzing 
 
 
72 papers. After identifying some key tensions, we chose to focus on and explain the most salient 
one in order to promote rich development followed by focused sublation. 
2.3 Sublation  
The contrastation step revealed a salient dialectical tension between the two bodies of knowledge. 
Instead of treating these knowledge bases as forces that are polarized one against the other 
(Bartunek & Rynes, 2014), we aimed at creating a bridging knowledge that considers a contingent 
performance for each side. We thus developed a sublating assumption and a theoretical model 
that explains when each knowledge type outperforms the other by drawing from relevant 
management and IS literature. We also discussed how such a theoretical model, of course subject 
to empirical validation, translates to some avenues for future prescriptive risk management 
research.  
3. Delineation Findings: What Did We Learn from Each Body of 
Knowledge?  
We synthesized each body of knowledge along its core constructs and main research models. 
Our review revealed some commonalities.  
First, both bodies of knowledge include the core constructs of risk and risk response. In 
most studies, risks are concerned with undesired events and thus do not cover positive outcomes 
(e.g. Barki, Rivard, & Talbot, 1993; Boehm, 1991). A key undesired event is project failure caused 
by deviations from project objectives (e.g., Barki et al., 2001). In some studies, the undesired 
event is an intermediary event (e.g., user-team conflict) that will later impact project objectives. 
Studies on both normative and experiential knowledge refer to the causes of undesired events 
(e.g., project characteristics such as complexity) as risk sources (Powell & Klein, 1996), risk items 
(Boehm, 1991; Keil, Li, Mathiassen, & Zheng, 2008), or risk factors (Barki et al., 1993). A risk 
response is a project management activity enacted to deal with specific risk sources or undesired 
events. Enacting a risk response is likely to change the state of a project (Charette, 1996a) by 
 
 
either modifying the existing managerial activities (e.g., adopting an agile development approach 
rather than a traditional one) or performing extra activities (e.g., liaising with user representatives). 
In dealing with risks, risk responses can serve three purposes: avoidance, mitigation, or transfer 
(Charette, 1996a; Heemstra & Kusters, 1996). Among these, risk mitigation is the most proactive 
way of responding to risks. It aims at reducing the likelihood of undesired events by reducing or 
eliminating risk sources and/or limiting their negative impact if they do occur. When no risk 
response is enacted, risks are being accepted.  
Second, both bodies of knowledge examine risks and risk responses at different levels of 
aggregation. For example, individual risk factors are combined to estimate the overall project risk 
(Wallace, Keil, & Rai, 2004a) or risk exposure (Barki et al., 2001). Likewise, while some risk 
responses target specific areas of a project (e.g., increasing user participation), others pertain to 
the entire project, for example, terminating high risk projects (Jani, 2011).  
Third, both bodies of knowledge have examined risk management using variance and 
process models. Variance models explain the relationships between risk management constructs 
such as risks and risk responses. Process models look at the sequence of steps in risk 
management, for example, suggesting whether and how risk responses are enacted after some 
significant risks have been identified.  
Despite such commonalities, the two bodies of knowledge significantly differ in their 
definitions of constructs and their specification of research models. They thus provide different 
contributions to our understanding of IT project risk management. 
3.1 The Normative Body of Knowledge 
Most studies that constitute the normative body of knowledge have relied on classical decision 
theories such as expected utility theory (EUT) (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) and have 
conceptualized risk management as decision making (e.g., Lyytinen, Mathiassen, & Ropponen, 
 
 
1996). The core constructs of this body of knowledge are presented below and the main learning 
yielded is synthesized within a process model and a variance model. 
3.1.1 Core Constructs 
Three risk-related constructs are key in this literature: risk, risk exposure, and residual risk (or 
residual risk exposure). Risk (used in its specific sense) refers to the probability of undesired 
outcomes (Barki et al., 2001). Risk exposure refers to expected loss (Barki et al., 1993; Boehm, 
1991; Heemstra & Kusters, 1996), which accounts for both the probability of undesired outcomes 
and their impact if they occur. Residual risk incorporates the risk-reducing effect of enacted risk 
responses (Jiang, Klein, & Chen, 2006; Nidumolu, 1995).  
Risk assessment is considered an analytical process. Such analysis can be carried out by 
deliberate thinking. For example, ITPMs can think about what can go wrong because of a specific 
risk factor. Nevertheless, researchers have dedicated much attention to measuring the risk 
exposure construct following EUT and its descendants. A second-order MIMIC construct 
displayed in Figure 2 summarizes these measurement efforts. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – A Synthesis of the Conceptualizations and Operationalizations of Risk Exposure from 
the Normative Body of Knowledge 
Some studies have conceptualized risk exposure as a first-order reflective construct (e.g., 
Jani, 2011). Others have conceptualized it as a second-order construct with two dimensions:  
probability of failure (or of undesired events) and impact. While probability can be measured 
reflectively, it can also be measured formatively using a composite of the probabilities of specific 
undesired events. When probability is difficult to measure, it is approximated by the level of 
uncertainty in the project (Barki et al., 1993; Wallace et al., 2004a). One can measure uncertainty 
using direct indicators; yet to estimate uncertainty formatively, which is more common, a 
composite of multiple risk sources is used (e.g., Barki et al., 2001). Because formative 
measurement provides a rich and actionable understanding of a construct, the literature has 
developed several checklists of risk sources and events in IT projects (e.g., Barki et al., 1993; Keil 
et al., 2008; Lyytinen et al., 1998; Schmidt et al., 2001). While some lists are generic to most IT 
projects (e.g., Schmidt et al., 2001), others are tailored to specific project types such as ERP (e.g., 
Ehie & Madsen, 2005) or specific countries (e.g., Mursu, Lyytinen, Soriyan, & Korpela, 2003). To 
 
 
make such lists manageable, risk sources are ranked in order of importance (e.g., Boehm, 1991) 
or are combined into fewer categories (e.g., Wallace, Keil, & Rai, 2004b). Categorization is 
performed using theories such as a socio-technical model of software development (e.g., Lyytinen 
et al., 1998), methods such as cluster analysis (e.g., Wallace et al., 2004b), perceptions such as 
perceived level of controllability and/or importance of risks (e.g., Keil et al., 1998; Mursu et al., 
2003), temporal characteristics such as a priori vs. emergent nature of risks (Gemino, Reich, & 
Sauer, 2008), or project phases (e.g., Powell & Klein, 1996). Taken together, these lists suggest 
that, while technology-related risks are important, user risks (e.g., user resistance) and top 
management support are major issues (Keil et al., 1998; Schmidt et al., 2001). 
The second dimension of risk exposure is the impact of risks. Reflectively, impact indicators 
can be derived from risk archives, brainstorming, or ITPMs’ perceptions. Formatively, one can 
identify various impacts of risks and assign magnitude of impact values to the risk events. Risk 
impacts are usually conceptualized as the extent of deviation from various specified project 
objectives (Barki et al., 2001). Traditionally, project objectives are specified using the three 
dimensions of time, cost, and scope; but more recently, stakeholder satisfaction and acceptance 
have also been considered (de Bakker et al., 2010; Jiang & Klein, 1999).  
The next step in assessing risk exposure is to combine the two dimensions. Following the 
expected utility formula in EUT, many have done so by multiplying the measured probability (or 
uncertainty) and impact values (Barki et al., 1993; Baskerville & Stage, 1996; Boehm, 1991; 
Charette, 1996a), thus creating a multiplicative multidimensional construct (Law, Wong, & Mobley, 
1998). This can be done by a manual calculation or using a software tool that embeds the 
formulae (e.g., Du, Keil, Mathiassen, Shen, & Tiwana, 2007).  
In a comprehensive measurement of risk exposure, Barki et al. (2001) measure this 
construct simultaneously as a first-order construct in a reflective fashion (using criterion variables) 
and as a multiplicative second-order construct (using formative items for each uncertainty and 
impact dimension).  
 
 
While much research attention is paid to defining and measuring risks, as also noted by de 
Bakker et al. (2010), not very much has been said about risk responses. In discussing risk 
responses, researchers have addressed the question of what should be the response to a specific 
risk source (Lyytinen et al., 1998) and have offered lists of heuristics that associate risk sources 
with risk responses (e.g., Addison & Vallabh, 2002; Baccarini, Salm, & Love, 2004; Baskerville & 
Stage, 1996; Boehm, 1991; Keil et al., 1998; Lyytinen et al., 1998; Moynihan, 2002; Sumner, 
2000; Tesch, Kloppenborg, & Frolick, 2007). Three broad categories of risk responses are internal 
integration (dealing with project teams), external integration (with end users), and formal planning 
(e.g., Barki et al., 2001; Gemino et al., 2008; Mignerat & Rivard, 2012). These categories have 
been used to measure a project’s risk management profile as a multidimensional construct (Barki 
et al., 2001). 
3.1.2 Process Studies 
A central theme in the normative body of knowledge is the formal risk management process, 
portrayed as comprising several phases required to ensure risk assessment and control 
(Charette, 1996a). The generic process, adapted from the choice process in classical decision 
theories, is presented in Figure 3. It captures essential elements of several prescribed processes 
(e.g., Boehm, 1991; Charette, 1996a; Fairly, 1994; Heemstra & Kusters, 1996; Powell & Klein, 
1996). Table C1 in Appendix C presents the studies that mention each step, and other reviews of 
the processes are available in Kutsch and Hall (2009, p. 73, Table 1) and Bannerman (2008, p. 
2121). 
 
 
 
Figure 3 ⎼ A Process Model of IT Project Risk Management Derived from the Normative Body of 
Knowledge (adapted from Boehm 1991) 
Our analysis suggests that risk management often includes the two major steps of risk 
assessment and risk control. Risk assessment involves (S1) risk identification (e.g., using a risk 
checklist to identify risk sources in a project); (S2) risk analysis (i.e., estimating the risk exposure 
of each of the identified risk sources, for example, by analyzing probabilities and impacts); and 
(S3) risk prioritization (i.e., using risk exposure to rank risks in the order of deserved attention). 
Risk control comprises (S4) risk response planning (e.g., using heuristics lists to choose risk 
responses); (S5) risk response enactment (implementing risk responses to deal with risks); and 
(S6) risk monitoring, in which risks and the planned responses are kept in a risk register (log) and 
are reviewed over the course of the project to ensure proper implementation. The entire process 
is frequently iterated as a cycle (S7). 
3.1.3 Variance Studies 
Several studies within the normative body of knowledge have theorized on and tested 
relationships between risks, risk responses, applying formal risk management practices, and 
project performance. Their key findings are synthesized in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 ⎼ A Synthesized Variance Model of IT Project Risk Management from the Normative 
Body of Knowledge 
 
As indicated by R1(-) in the model, risks negatively impact project performance (e.g., 
Nidumolu,1996; Wallace et al., 2004a). This negative impact can be direct (Jiang & Klein, 2000) 
or mediated through intermediary risks (Jiang et al., 2006; Gemino et al., 2008; Wallace et al., 
2004a). For example, social and technical risks influence project success via project management 
risks (Wallace et al., 2004a). Research suggests that specific risk responses can increase project 
performance if they fit with risks—R2(+). Fit has been examined in two ways. First, it has been 
identified theoretically, as a heuristic match between some specific risks and risk responses, that 
is, a presumably effective managerial intervention (Lyytinen et al., 1996; Lyytinen et al., 1998). 
Second, fit has been identified empirically, using calibration samples to determine what risk 
responses are appropriate for which risk exposure levels and which project performance criteria 
(product or process) (Barki et al., 2001). Without considering such a contingent fit, studying the 
direct impact of risk responses on project performance (R3+) resulted in mixed findings 
(Nidumolu, 1996). When there is a fit, risk responses contribute to project performance by 
reducing residual risk (R4-) that will have a weaker negative effect on project performance (R5-) 
than untreated risks (R1-) (Jiang et al., 2006; Nidumolu, 1995). Research also suggests that 
 
 
applying a formal risk management process decreases some project risks and impacts project 
performance (R6+) (Ropponen & Lyytinen, 1997), especially because it offers a communicative 
action that enables project stakeholders to talk about risks (de Bakker, Boonstra, & Wortmann, 
2011). Also, R6(+) has an inverted-U shape, in that it has been shown that very low levels of risk 
management and very high levels of risk management deter project performance (Ropponen & 
Lyytinen, 1997). Table C2 in Appendix C details the findings of each relevant study in our pool. 
3.2 The Experiential Body of Knowledge 
The experiential body of knowledge is based on the premise that understanding the nature of IT 
project risk requires studying ITPMs’ risk judgments (Lauer, 1996). Our review yielded a relative 
scarcity of studies adopting an experiential perspective, aiming to understand how ITPMs manage 
risks and why they sometimes do so differently from normative prescriptions. Below we present 
the core constructs from this literature and synthesize its key process and variance findings.  
3.2.1 Core Constructs 
A core construct in this literature is perceived risk (or risk perception). Drawing from Sitkin and 
Pablo (1992), researchers have defined perceived risk as “the belief that there exist sources of 
risk with potential to adversely affect project outcomes” (Du et al., 2007, p. 272). Like the notion 
of risk exposure, risk perception has been conceptualized as reflecting both the probability of 
undesired events and the loss associated with their occurrence (Du et al., 2007). There are 
indications, however, of the difference between the risk perceptions of ITPMs and risk exposure 
as defined in the normative body of knowledge. First, ITPMs often focus on few but not many risk 
factors (Schmidt et al., 2001). Second, as compared to the normative definition of risk exposure, 
ITPMs’ risk perceptions focus on the impact rather than the probability of occurrence of risk events 
(Keil et al., 2000); Third, for ITPMs, there might be more dimensions to risk perception, including 
uncontrollability (Keil et al., 1998; Mursu et al., 2003; Pablo, 1999), lack of information (Pablo, 
1999), and the timing of a loss occurrence at which a loss might occur (Kutsch et al., 2013). Most 
 
 
attempts to capture the level of perceived risk use self-reports with reflective indicators (e.g., Du 
et al., 2007); however, recent neuroscience studies of risk perception motivate more objective 
ways of measuring it (e.g., Volz & Gigerenzer, 2012).  
Lists of ITPMs’ perceived risks have been compared across individuals (Moynihan, 1997), 
across ITPMs from different countries (Schmidt et al., 2001), to the risk lists in the normative body 
of knowledge (Moynihan, 1996; 1997), with other stakeholders such as senior executives (Liu, 
Zhang, Keil, & Chen, 2010), and with users (Keil, Tiwana, & Bush, 2002). It appears that ITPMs 
differ significantly in terms of the risk factors they attend to (Moynihan, 1997). Moreover, although 
there is an overlap between the risk sources that ITPMs perceive to be recurring and the risk 
sources covered by influential normative studies, ITPMs also raise issues that have received little 
attention in the normative body of knowledge, such as the extent of control over a project or the 
source of project control (Moynihan, 1996).  
Also, the literature highlights the specific risk responses that ITPMs enact (Liu et al., 2010; 
Moynihan, 2000; Tesch et al., 2007), which are sometimes different from those of other sources, 
e.g., senior executives (Liu et al., 2010). At the project level, three commonly studied risk 
response decisions of ITPMs are: accepting to undertake a project (Lauer, 1996), continuing with 
a project (Keil et al., 2000), or applying formal risk management prescriptions in a project (Kutsch 
& Hall, 2009). Research suggests that deliberate risk ignorance, especially in the form of waiting 
to see what will happen and dealing with it if it happens, is a common risk response (Kutsch & 
Hall, 2005). 
3.2.2 Process Studies 
It has been noted that normative studies have largely assumed that ITPMs will—most likely—use 
normative prescriptions (de Bakker et al., 2010). However, experiential studies find that ITPMs 
often disengage from most normative prescriptions over time. In terms of the overall process, one 
study of ITPMs found that they considered risk management a “box-ticking” exercise, which 
 
 
suggests that they did not consider it a worthwhile practice (Kutsch & Hall, 2005). Moreover, 
studies have found that the majority of the ITPMs surveyed did not follow any risk management 
approach (Ropponen, 1999). Disengagement from formal risk management can happen at any 
point in the process. Figure 5 summarizes where these disengagements occur, and Table C3 in 
Appendix C details the findings in the literature.  
 
Figure 5 ⎼ A Synthesized Process Model of Experiential IT Project Risk Management  
The first specific disengagement can happen from a formal risk identification (D1). An early 
study found that risk checklists were used only by 33% of ITPMs (Ropponen, 1999). Kutsch et al. 
(2013) report that among the 19 ITPMs in their study who planned on managing risks, five did not 
adopt any practice to identify risks. Yet, another recent study reports that risk identification was 
conducted in all the projects that were part of the study (de Bakker, Boonstra, & Wortmann, 2012). 
This supports the argument that some risk management processes are now widely 
institutionalized (Mignerat & Rivard, 2012). Regarding risk analysis (D2), studies have found that 
many organizations do not explicitly evaluate risk (Armour, 2005), especially in a quantitative 
fashion (Bannerman, 2008). Kutsch et al. (2013) report that among the 14 ITPMs who performed 
risk identification, seven did not assess the probabilities and eight did not determine the impacts 
of risks. Likewise, researchers have found that ITPMs felt ambivalence about how accurately risk 
 
 
prioritization was conducted (Bannerman, 2008) (D3). Moreover, often risk assessment is not 
followed by risk response planning (D4) (Kutsch et al., 2013; Taylor, 2005). Even when specific 
risk responses are formally planned, they might never be enacted (D5) (Taylor, 2005). 
Furthermore, ITPMs rarely refer to the risks logged in earlier project stages when taking an action 
(D6) (Taylor, 2005). Finally, the cycle of risk management is seldom iterated throughout the 
course of a project (D7) (Bannerman, 2008; Carr, 1997; de Bakker et al., 2010); often, the formal 
risk management process is applied once at the beginning of a project, if at all (Bannerman, 
2008). 
When ITPMs disengage from normative prescriptions, they might deliberately ignore risks 
(S1) and avoid any action, for instance, by delaying or delegating their risk response decisions 
(Kutsch & Hall, 2005; Kutsch & Hall, 2010). Alternatively, they might continute to perform risk 
management (S2) in an experiential way, e.g., using intuition (Baskerville & Stage, 1996; 
Drummond, 1996; Ropponen, 1999). Intuition refers to “automatic and relatively effortless 
processing and learning of information” (Dane & Pratt, 2007, p. 35) and implies learning from 
personal experience and developing perceptions without explicit awareness (Dane & Pratt, 2007). 
It is, therefore, anchored in personal experience and expertise without using tools or techniques.  
3.2.3 Variance Studies 
Variance studies in the experiential body of knowledge are concerned with the antecedents of 
risk perception and the risk response enactment decisions of ITPMs (Figure 6). The findings of 
relevant studies are included in Table C 4 in Appendix C. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 ⎼ A Synthesized Variance Model of BoK2 Studies of IT Project Risk Management  
Those studies suggest that the normative knowledge-based prescribed tools and 
techniques (e.g., risk checklists) have some impact (P1) on the risk perceptions of ITPMs; they 
influence novice ITPMs but not experts (Keil et al., 2008). Researchers have examined the impact 
of other antecedents on risk perceptions. For example, following Sitkin and Pablo (1992), the 
impacts of ITPMs’ risk propensity on risk perception (P2) have been studied, although the results 
suggest limited (Huff & Prybutok, 2008) or insignificant (Keil et al., 2000) relationships. Similarly, 
the impact of ITPMs’ risk perception on risk response enactment, P3(+) is sometimes significant 
(Keil et al., 2000) but at other times insignificant (e.g., Du et al., 2007). Moreover, normative tools 
and techniques have no or limited impact (P4) on the decision to enact risk responses (Du et al., 
2007; Keil et al., 2008). Considering that P3 and P4 have limited effects, it seems that ITPMs’ risk 
response behaviors are largely determined by other factors (P5). One such examined factor is 
risk propensity, although it is found to have a limited (Huff & Prybutok, 2008) or insignificant (Keil 
et al., 2000) impact. Other factors discussed include the costs of risk responses and the politics 
around them (Bannerman, 2008). 
 
  
 
 
3.3 On the Creation of Dialectical Forces 
The above delineation effort recognizes several divergences between the two bodies of 
knowledge that thus create two dialectical forces. First, in terms of construct definitions, the 
normative and experiential bodies of knowledge differ on what constitutes risk and risk response. 
For example, while the normative risk exposure construct has a specific two-dimensional 
definition, risk perception captures a broader range of dimensions. Second, in terms of theoretical 
models of how risks should be assessed and responded to, the two bodies of knowledge differ 
significantly. For example, experiential knowledge considers disengaging from the normative 
prescriptions on the risk management process as a rational decision (Kutsch & Hall, 2009). 
Apparently, there are some tensions about which behavior is more conducive to proper risk 
management and, thus, increased project performance. These tensions deserve to be better 
identified and addressed, considering that (1) IT projects have a high failure rate largely due to 
unmanaged risks (Bloch, Blumberg, & Laartz, 2012; Charette & Romero, 2015; Flyvbjerg & 
Budzier, 2011); (2) risk management prescriptions in research can be disseminated to ITPMs 
(Mignerat & Rivard, 2012); (3) the existence of these tensions, given the possible wisdom in both 
bodies of knowledge, makes choosing only one of them for developing prescriptions a frail 
decision (Baskerville & Stage, 1996); and (4) to date, clear guidelines on how to address the 
tensions by reconciling the two knowledge bases is lacking. Therefore, in the next section we will 
contrast the two bodies of knowledge to find a core dialectical tension; and, in the section after 
that, we will attempt to reconcile that tension. 
4. Contrastation Findings: What are Some Key Conceptual Tensions 
between the Two Bodies of Knowledge?  
The contrastation step revealed dialectical tensions between the assumptions of the two bodies 
of knowledge. In particular, we found a widely discussed tension regarding the relative importance 
of the probability and impact dimensions of risk exposure (48 relevant excerpts in 28 papers). 
 
 
Whereas the normative view assumes that the probability of the undesired outcomes dimension 
of risk exposure is—at least—as important as the impact of the undesired outcomes dimension, 
the experiential view considers that the impact of the undesired outcomes dimension of risk 
exposure is more important than its probability of occurrence dimension (e.g., Bannerman, 2008; 
Taylor et al., 2012). We identified another key tension regarding the relative importance of various 
determinants to be considered for a risk response decision (161 pertinent excerpts in 42 papers). 
Our contrastation revealed that the normative body of knowledge—as a collective—assumes that 
the determinants of a successful risk response enactment decision are the level of risk exposure 
and the expected risk-mitigation effects of the risk response; however, the experiential body of 
knowledge considers that the determinants of a successful risk response enactment decision are 
beyond the level of risk exposure and the risk-mitigation effects of the risk response. One 
dialectical tension about the nature of risk assessment, however, stood out in our contrastation 
(199 relevant excerpts in 53 papers). Given that risk assessment is often a key basis for any risk 
response action, in the following we choose to focus on this salient tension to enable a deeper 
discussion of the contrastation as well as sublation.  
4.1 A Key Tension about the Nature of Risk Assessment: The Relative 
Performance of Intuition and Deliberate Analysis 
Both normative and experiential bodies of knowledge agree that the performance of risk 
assessment—which refers to both effectiveness and efficiency—is important for project success. 
Effectiveness involves the ability of the risk assessment process to cover all significant risk 
sources and events (Powell & Klein, 1996), risk interrelationships (Hwang, Hsiao, Chen, & Chern, 
2016), and risk timing and dynamics (Hwang et al., 2016; Ward, 1999). It also concerns the ability 
of the process to provide sound risk exposure estimates to prioritize the identified risk sources in 
the order of the response attention they need (Ward, 1999). Effective risk assessment provides 
an impetus for timely action before it is too late by influencing the behavior of key stakeholders 
(Thamhain, 2013). For example, it can motivate ITPMs to coordinate an appropriate risk response 
 
 
enactment or to synchronize the perceptions of those involved (de Bakker et al., 2011). Efficiency 
is concerned with the cost justifiability of the resources (e.g., effort) required for producing an 
accurate risk assessment (Kutsch and Hall, 2009), considering that project managers often lack 
the power to secure all the required resources (Pinto, 2000). Our contrastation revealed a 
conceptual tension between the two bodies of knowledge on the relative performance of intuition 
and deliberate analysis for risk assessment. 
4.2 Normative Assumption 
Most of the normative body of knowledge has prescribed that ITPMs perform a deliberate analysis 
of risks using the offered tools (e.g., risk archives, risk checklists, risk exposure instruments) and 
techniques (e.g., calculating risk exposure by conducting brainstorming sessions). Indeed, 
research suggests that such analysis provides a scientific anchor to risk assessment (Slovic & 
Peters, 2006) and is a means of focusing attention on the risk assessment exercise (Dane & Pratt, 
2007). In this regard, our contrastation reveals several manifestations of how and why the 
normative body of knowledge considers deliberate analysis to outperform intuition.  
Some manifestations concern the relative effectiveness of deliberate analysis. In 
Manifestation A, it is suggested that deliberate analysis covers a wider range of relevant risks 
than intuition. Analytical tools can enable organizational learning by capturing the past 
experiences of experts (Lyytinen & Robey, 1999). For example, specific risk repositories enable 
learning within organizations, and generic risk checklists (often developed through Delphi studies 
of experts) enable learning across organizations (e.g., Moynihan, 1997; Schmidt et al., 2001). The 
normative body of knowledge considers that, by using such learning, more relevant risks could 
be identified. For example, Keil et al. (2008) conclude that the risk checklist they developed in 
their study helps ITPMs identify actual risks. In Manifestation B, using deliberate analysis is 
viewed as increasing the accuracy of risk estimates (Keil et al., 2000). This manifestation 
considers that intuition can be erroneous, and that analytical approaches help ITPMs avoid 
 
 
cognitive biases that can lead to missing or over/underestimating risks (Gemmer, 1997; Kutsch & 
Maylor, 2011). In Manifestation C, deliberate analysis is considered to be a better motivator for 
risk response enactment than intuition. Deliberate analysis using techniques such as risk 
brainstorming sessions is viewed as enabling communicative action that can harmonize the risk 
perceptions of different stakeholders (de Bakker et al., 2011) and thus reduce disparities among 
stakeholders’ perceptions (Keil et al., 2002). Accordingly, they are believed to enable a group of 
experts to reach a consensus and orchestrate action (Lyytinen et al., 1998). Likewise, as 
Drummond (1996) reports, some view intuitions as inadmissible for risk response decision 
making.  
The last manifestation concerns the higher efficiency of deliberate analysis. In Manifestation 
D, it is suggested that deliberate analysis reduces the required information processing efforts 
because it standardizes how risks are identified (e.g., using checklists) and how multiple items of 
information about risks are reduced into an overall evaluation (e.g., using the risk exposure 
formula). Such standardization helps ITPMs save effort in selecting and agreeing upon how to 
combine various items of information.  
In formal terms: 
Normative Assumption: Oftentimes, deliberate analysis outperforms intuition for 
risk assessment. 
4.3 Experiential Assumption 
Our synthesis of experiential studies (capturing the experiential knowledge created by ITPMs) 
suggests that ITPMs often decide upon risk responses based on risk perceptions derived by 
intuition without the assistance of analytical risk assessment tools and techniques (Bannerman, 
2008; Kutsch et al., 2013; Ropponen, 1999). Our contrastation reveals several manifestations of 
how and why many ITPMs (and some researchers alike) assume that intuition performs relatively 
better than deliberate analysis.  
 
 
Some manifestations concern the relative effectiveness of intuition. In Manifestation E, it is 
suggested that ITPMs’ intuition covers a wider range of relevant risks than risk checklists can. 
Risk checklists are argued to have a narrow span of attention (Lyytinen et al., 1998) and to create 
serious risk blind spots (Du et al., 2007; Keil et al., 2008). In Manifestation F, intuition is considered 
to provide more realistic risk estimates than deliberate analysis. While deliberate analysis tools 
and methods suggest a structured way of assessing risks, some ITPMs doubt whether risks can 
be carefully analyzed, believing that the produced risk estimates are not real (Kutsch et al., 2013). 
Particularly, deliberate analysis is viewed as conveying a false sense of precision, for example, 
by providing too precise probability estimates (Pfleeger, 2000). Moreover, intuition can see more 
dimensions to risk such as its timing or controllability (Pablo, 1999). In Manifestation G, intuition 
is considered to be more conducive to proper risk response enactment. Risk assessment tools 
and techniques sometimes have a limited impact on ITPMs’ risk perceptions (Baskerville & Stage, 
1996; Du et al., 2007) and response behaviors (Kutsch et al., 2013). The outputs of most risk 
assessment tools present risk assessment results as dry statistics, that is, in a too factual manner 
which lacks the affect that might be necessary for individuals to take action (Slovic & Peters, 
2006). However, intuition can motivate action because it creates an affective charge referred to 
as “gut feel” (Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2012, p. 116), which is potent enough to induce action 
(Gigerenzer, 2008). Particularly, a strong negative intuition may be experienced with visceral 
reactions, such as fear, anxiety or dread (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001), effects 
that deliberate analysis is less likely to induce.  
The last manifestation concerns the efficiency of intuition. In Manifestation H, intuition is 
considered to be less effortful than deliberate analysis. Intuition is heuristic driven and thus relies 
on mental shortcuts, such as reliance on accessible information (e.g., what happened last time) 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) for judgment and decision making. However, analysis can be 
unreasonably cumbersome. For example, for Taylor’s (2005) respondents, risk management in 
its normative sense was costly and considered a luxury. 
 
 
In formal terms:  
Experiential Assumption: Oftentimes, intuition outperforms deliberate analysis for 
risk assessment. 
Figure 7 illustrates the dialectical tension between the views on the relative performance of 
analytical and intuitive risk assessments. The next section proposes a model that can reconcile 
this tension. 
 
Figure 7 – A Summary of the Dialectical Tension between the Normative and Experiential Bodies of 
Knowledge on the Relative Performance of Intuition and Deliberate Analysis for Risk Assessment 
5. Sublation – Reconciling the Dialectical Tension on the Relative 
Performance of Deliberate Analysis and Intuition 
To reconcile the dialectical tension between the normative and the experiential bodies of 
knowledge on the relative performance of deliberate analysis and intuition, we adopt the 
perspective that the approaches may be complementary, implying that analytical methods can be 
complemented with managerial judgements (Thamhain, 2013). Therefore, rather than taking 
 
 
sides on either view, we sublate the views toward creating bridging knowledge. We first articulate 
an assumption that enables developing contingent theories that can account for both views:  
Sublating Assumption: Intuition and deliberate analysis can outperform each 
other.  
We then build on this assumption to develop a theoretical model of the contingencies that 
influence the relative performance of each approach (Figure 8). Drawing from the managerial 
decision-making literature (e.g., Dane & Pratt, 2007; Salas et al., 2010), we suggest that the three 
antecedent categories of project characteristics (risks’ temporal complexity and risks’ structural 
complexity), organization characteristics (project stakeholders’ involvement and methods-using 
pressures), and ITPMs’ characteristics (project-specific expertise) explain the relative 
performance of intuition and deliberate analysis for risk assessment. We also emphasize the role 
of project-specific expertise by explaining its moderating effects. The model’s constructs and their 
definitions are listed in Table 2. 
 
Figure 8 – A Model of the Relative Performance of Intuition and Deliberate Analysis for IT Project 
Risk Assessment  
 
 
Table 2 - Construct Definitions  
Construct Definition Dimensions Definition Relevant studies 
Relative 
Performance 
of Intuition 
Compared to 
Deliberate 
Analysis  
The difference between 
the performance of 
intuition and deliberate 
analysis for risk 
assessment in IT 
projects 
Relative Risk 
Coverage 
The extent to which one risk 
assessment process (intuition or 
deliberate analysis) identifies more 
relevant risks than the other process  
Du et al. (2007); Keil et 
al. (2008); Powell & 
Klein (1996) 
Relative 
Estimation 
Accuracy 
The extent to which one risk 
assessment process (intuition or 
deliberate analysis) identifies more 
reasonable risk exposure estimates 
than the other process 
Kutsch & Hall (2005); 
Kutsch & Maylor (2011); 
Pfleeger (2000); Ward 
(1999) 
Relative 
Action 
Impetus 
The extent to which one risk 
assessment process (intuition or 
deliberate analysis) motivates taking 
a timely action about risks better 
than the other process 
de Bakker et al. (2011); 
Kutsch & Hall (2010) 
Relative Cost 
Justifiability 
The extent to which on risk 
assessment process (intuition or 
deliberate analysis) is more efficient 
(time, effort, and other resources) 
than the other process 
Kutsch & Hall (2009); 
Ward (1999) 
Risks’ 
Temporal 
Complexity 
The extent to which 
risks’ existence and 
nature fluctuate over 
time 
Risk Source 
Emergence 
The extent to which the cause of an 
undesired outcome arises later in 
projects than existing earlier.  
Gemino et al. (2008); 
Thamhain (2013); 
Risk Event 
Imminence 
The time proximity between a risk 
source and the associated risk 
event(s) 
Hwang et al. (2016); 
Ward (1999) 
Risks’ 
Structural 
Complexity 
The extent to which 
risks are abundant and 
entangled in a project 
Risk 
Abundance 
The extent to which multiple risks 
co-exist in a project 
Barki et al. (2001); 
Schmidt et al. (2001) 
Risk 
Entanglement 
The extent to which risks are 
interconnected by causing or 
amplifying each other 
El-Masri & Rivard 
(2012); Hwang et al. 
(2016); Thamhain 
(2013); Ward (1999) 
Stakeholders’ 
Involvement 
in Risk 
Management 
The extent to which 
various project 
stakeholders 
participate in risk 
assessment and risk 
response planning  
Informational 
Involvement 
The extent to which ITPMs need to 
inform other project stakeholders of 
particular risks 
de Bakker et al. (2011); 
Thamhain (2013) 
Behavioral 
Engagement 
The extent to which ITPMs need to 
collaborate with other stakeholders 
in deciding about and committing to 
risk responses 
de Bakker et al. (2011); 
Kutsch & Hall (2010); 
Thamhain (2013) 
Methods-
using 
Pressures 
The extent to which 
credible sources of 
pressure expect the 
application (or non-
application) of 
deliberate risk 
assessment practices  
Direct 
Pressures 
(Injunctive) 
The extent to which using a specific 
analytical tool or technique is 
mandated 
Fishbein & Ajzen (2010); 
Mignerat & Rivard 
(2012) 
Indirect 
Pressures 
(Descriptive) 
The extent to which risk 
management is routinized in the 
environment surrounding an ITPM 
Kutsch et al. (2013) 
Project-
Specific 
Expertise 
The extent to which an 
ITPM has developed a 
deep and rich 
knowledge base from 
extensive experience 
with managing similar 
IT projects 
Experience The extent to which an ITPM has 
gained practical contact with similar 
IT projects, including the number of 
years of managing such projects 
and the number of projects 
Huff & Prybutok (2008) 
Training The extent to which an ITPM has 
received training—formal or 
informal—related to managing 
similar projects  
Huff & Prybutok (2008) 
 
  
 
 
5.1 Project Characteristics 
Risks’ Temporal Complexity. Project temporality refers to “the transition from the starting 
conditions to what happens during the project to its outcomes” (Gemino et al., 2008, p. 12), which 
creates risks with complex temporal characteristics (Gemino et al., 2008; Hwang et al., 2016; 
Ward, 1999). To examine two such characteristics, we define risks’ temporal complexity by the 
two dimensions of risk source emergence and risk event imminence. Risk source emergence 
refers to the extent to which the cause of an undesired outcome emerges during a project (Gemino 
et al., 2008). As risk values change over time, new risks can continue to emerge during a project. 
Risk event imminence refers to the extent to which the negative impact of a risk source on project 
performance is likely to materialize in a looming risk event after the risk source has emerged 
rather than in a distant risk event (Ward, 1999).  
We propose that risks’ temporal complexity increases the relative effectiveness of intuition 
in two ways. First, risk source emergence influences the relative estimation accuracy of intuition. 
A priori risks are discovered early in projects (Gemino et al., 2008), when ITPMs have not yet 
developed a deep understanding of the project. Such unfamiliarity with the specifics of a project 
makes ITPMs’ intuition unready for pattern recognition; thus, they may rely on generic risk 
checklists to understand risks (Thamhain, 2013). However, emergent risks arise when a project 
has progressed in time and ITPMs have developed a deeper familiarity with the project. This effect 
is consistent with the findings that analytical tools are used chiefly at the beginning of IT projects 
(Bannerman, 2008; Ropponen, 1999; Taylor, 2007). Second, risk source emergence increases 
the relative action impetus of intuition. Sometimes, risk responses might be effective only if they 
are enacted early enough (Addison & Vallabh, 2002). But emergent risks do not have a specific 
timeframe for arising; therefore, they require ongoing consideration unless some action can 
eliminate them (Ward, 1999). While intuition is continuous, deliberate analysis needs to be 
iterated (Baskerville & Stage, 1996), for example, as a risk review after each project milestone. 
 
 
Thus, intuition is more instrumental in dealing with emergent risks. The importance of such 
continuous risk assessment has been emphasized in IS by highlighting the role of maintaining 
risk mindfulness (Kutsch et al. 2013) and situational awareness (Taylor, 2007). Similarly, when 
risks are identified, they may need an urgent response. This urgency creates time pressure, and 
intuition outperforms analysis under time pressure (Dane, Rockmann, & Pratt, 2012). Intuition 
quickly induces feelings of dread and stress, and thus it is instrumental when there is a “need to 
act fast” (Gigerenzer, 2008); but, with some exceptions (e.g., Ward, 1999), most deliberate 
analysis methods are silent about risk response urgency.  
We also propose that risks’ temporal complexity influences the relative efficiency of intuition. 
Risk source emergence increases the frequency of re-applications of tools and techniques; 
therefore, it makes deliberate analysis increasingly more time-consuming. Intuition, however, is 
quite automatic, no matter how many times it is used. Therefore, emergent risks make intuition 
relatively more efficient. Moreover, risk event imminence increases the time pressure; as time 
becomes a more precious commodity, deliberate analysis becomes costlier and less justified than 
intuition. Indeed, researchers suggests that time pressure motivates individuals to rely more on 
intuition than on deliberate analysis (Salas et al. 2010). 
Proposition 1:  Risks’ temporal complexity positively influences the relative 
performance of intuition compared to deliberate analysis for risk 
assessment.  
Risks’ Structural Complexity. Another aspect of complexity in projects is the number of 
structural elements and their interactions (Thamhain, 2013; Whitty & Maylor, 2009). Building on 
this, we define project risks’ complexity as the extent to which risks are abundant and entangled 
in a project. Risk abundance refers to the extent to which multiple risks co-exist in a project. 
Indeed, IT projects can involve various risks such as new technologies, large application size, 
lack of team expertise, application complexity, and uncertainty about requirements (Barki et al., 
2001). Risk entanglement refers to the extent to which risks are intertwined by causing or 
amplifying each other (El-Masri and Rivard, 2012; Hwang et al., 2016; Thamhain, 2013; Ward, 
 
 
1999). Together, risk abundance and risk entanglement can create compounding outcomes, with 
risks exhibiting cascading and/or nonlinear effects. For example, few small unattended risks can 
create a domino effect (Hwang et al., 2016; Thamhain, 2013). Risks’ structural complexity varies 
across projects. For example, while it might be low in a small IT infrastructure project, it could be 
strong in large projects (Charette, 2005).  
We propose that project risks’ structural complexity increases the relative estimation 
accuracy of intuition. First, low risk abundance and entanglement mean that the structure of the 
problem can be easily decomposed (e.g., using a root cause analysis, or by defining one impact 
and one probability values instead of a distribution for each) so that each piece can be analytically 
evaluated. A typical deliberate analysis can be performed under such situations. However, high 
complexity means an increased number of informational items are processed in an unstructured 
way. Deliberate analysis involves controlled reasoning and comprehensive logic (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2005) in which the problem is decomposed into multiple evaluable pieces (so that one 
can name the analytical steps taken to produce the results) and, as such, cannot easily handle 
complex and dynamic situations. While analytical methods that can reasonably deal with high 
complexity are rare (Hwang et al., 2016), intuition can simultaneously handle multiple informative 
items (Dane & Pratt, 2007) in an indecomposable context (Dane et al., 2012; Salas et al., 2010) 
since it uses heuristics processing (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). Second, low risk entanglement 
means less dynamic effects, and the analytical results will remain valid for some time. However, 
risks’ structural complexity can create high temporal complexity, and, as proposed above, intuition 
outperforms deliberate analysis for highly temporal risks. In the same vein, researchers suggest 
that while most analytical approaches are created using the normative body of knowledge 
(Lyytinen et al., 1996), simple heuristics might perform better under high uncertainty (Volz & 
Gigerenzer, 2012). Likewise, IS researchers argue that relying on experience is more 
advantageous in the context of complex and ill-structured tasks (Huff & Prybutok, 2008).  
 
 
We also posit that project risks’ complexity increases the relative efficiency of intuition. 
When project risks are complex, analyzing all the informational items that interact and change 
dynamically can become an increasingly cumbersome task because it requires processing too 
many information cues (Dane et al., 2012) which could lead to a state colloquially known as 
“paralysis by analysis”. Intuition, however, can continue to process multiple informational items in 
complex problem spaces rapidly and effortlessly (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005).  
Proposition 2: Risks’ structural complexity has a positive effect on the relative 
performance of intuition compared to deliberate analysis for risk 
assessment.  
5.2 Organizational Characteristics 
Stakeholders’ Involvement in Risk Management. We define stakeholders’ involvement in risk 
management as the extent to which various project stakeholders participate in risk assessment 
and risk response planning. Such involvement has two dimensions of informational and/or 
behavioral engagement. Informational involvement refers to the extent to which ITPMs need to 
inform other project stakeholders of particular risks. While communications with stakeholders are 
an integral part of a project manager’s function (PMI, 2013), the extent varies according to context. 
Sometimes ITPMs need to share information about risks with others, for example, to ensure that 
all team members’ actions are aligned (Gemmer, 1997). Yet, at other times, ITPMs opt for 
deliberate risk denial—i.e., the refusal to reveal risk information that could have a negative 
connotation (Kutsch & Hall, 2005)—because speaking about risks can create unnecessary 
anxiety among stakeholders (Kutsch & Hall, 2005). Behavioral involvement refers to the extent to 
which ITPMs need to collaborate with other stakeholders in deciding about and committing to risk 
responses. It comprises but surpasses informational involvement. Behavioral involvement is low 
when risk responses are within the control of ITPMs or when stakeholders refrain from responding 
unless risk actually materializes (Kutsch & Hall, 2010) rather than proactively managing risks. 
However, behavioral involvement is strong, for example, when ITPMs need the explicit support 
 
 
and authorization of top management (Kutsch et al., 2013; Whittaker, 1999), when the requisite 
resources for risk response must be provided by other stakeholders (e.g., peer managers), and 
when risk response can change the fate of—troubled—projects (Taylor, 2007).  
We postulate that stakeholders’ involvement decreases the relative action impetus of 
intuition. First, when informational involvement is low, risk communication is not a concern, and 
intuition suffices. However, when informational involvement is strong, convincing communications 
are required to leave no doubt about risk estimates’ credibility (Gemmer, 1997; Kutsch & Hall, 
2010), and thus deliberate analysis outperforms intuition. Intuition is hard to communicate to 
others because it is often nonconscious and creates the impression of knowing about something 
but not about why this knowledge exists (Salas et al., 2010). In contrast, deliberate analysis 
provides a shared language to communicate about risks with stakeholders (de Bakker et al., 
2011). Similarly, IS research has shown that a common belief is that decisions made using 
deliberate analysis can be defended even when they are wrong, while intuition is quasi-
unjustifiable even when it would lead to the right decision (Drummond, 1996). Second, when 
behavioral involvement is low, ITPMs personally lead risk response enactment without the need 
to collaborate with many others. However, when behavioral involvement is strong, ITPMs need to 
credibly communicate not only that risks are pertinent but also that certain risk mitigations should 
be enacted (Kutsch & Hall, 2005); otherwise, stakeholders are likely to withhold cooperation 
(Kutsch & Hall, 2010). Given the low relative impetus of intuition when risk management is 
collaborative, it is common for people to do analyses to defend their intuition, especially when 
they are legally responsible for the decision (Gigerenzer, 2007). In this regard, Baskerville and 
Stage (1996, p. 484) suggest: “The probability arithmetic [used for a normative risk assessment] 
is the language for expressing a subjective, but well-founded, professional opinion.” 
Proposition 3:  Project stakeholders’ involvement has a negative effect on the 
relative performance of intuition compared to deliberate analysis for 
risk assessment.  
 
 
Methods-using Pressures. Methods-using pressures refer to credible pressures from key 
stakeholders to apply deliberate, often formal, risk assessment practices, especially when 
deciding upon risk response enactment. Methods-using pressures can be direct or indirect. Direct 
(i.e., injunctive) pressures refer to the extent to which using a specific analytical tool (e.g., 
software) or technique (e.g., brainstorming sessions) is mandated. For example, some 
stakeholders (e.g., upper management or the project management office) might expect ITPMs to 
perform formal risk assessment and enforce this through control and governance mechanisms to 
arrive at higher levels of risk management maturity or in response to environmental pressures 
such as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (Mignerat & Rivard, 2012). Indirect pressures refer to the 
organizational routines of risk management (Kutsch et al., 2013) or risk management best 
practices (e.g., in PMI’s PMBoK, 2013). Such pressures usually stem from the norms that have 
been created by institutionalized risk management practices (Mignerat & Rivard, 2012).  
We propose that methods-using pressures decrease the relative action impetus of intuition. 
When methods-using pressures are weak, ITPMs are not concerned with complying with any 
specific risk assessment norms; therefore, intuitions are strong enough to motivate (or prevent) 
risk response enactment. However, when such pressures are strong, ITPMs are likely to try to 
satisfy key project stakeholders’ requests especially for a sensitive function such as risk 
assessment. Indeed, ITPMs are found to believe that “[i]n order to be recognised and accepted 
by customers and other stakeholders, there was an expectation and pressure to conform to the 
prescribed routine of risk management” (Kutsch et al., 2013, p. 7). In a similar vein, the decision-
making literature suggests that the use of intuition decreases when people are instructed to use 
the provided criteria for decision making (Dane et al., 2012). 
Proposition 4:  Methods-using pressures have a negative effect on the relative 
performance of intuition compared to deliberate analysis for risk 
assessment.  
 
 
 
5.1 ITPMs’ Characteristics  
Project-specific Expertise. The model emphasizes the role of an ITPM’s characteristics, in 
particular, project-specific expertise, in influencing the relative performance of intuition over 
deliberate analysis, both directly and as a moderator of the influence of the other antecedents. 
Building on the notion of expertise-based intuition (Salas et al., 2010), we define project-
specific expertise as the extent to which an ITPM has developed a deep and rich knowledge base 
from extensive experience in managing similar IT projects. ITPMs vary in their project-specific 
expertise based on their experience in managing similar projects (Huff & Prybutok, 2008) and the 
training they receive in the technical (domain knowledge) and managerial aspects of such projects 
(e.g., formal training on agile software development). 
Understanding the relationship between project-specific expertise and the performance of 
intuition requires the knowledge of how intuition works. Intuition uses pattern recognition, i.e., one 
estimates the outcome of a current situation by identifying and inferring from similar cases in the 
past. First, one has to possess a rich subjective sample of cause-effects. Second, one must 
possess and use heuristics, defined as mental shortcuts for information storage and retrieval 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Heuristics work through attribute-substitution, whereby one 
answers a difficult question using an accessible answer to a related—but easier—question. Here 
accessibility refers to “the ease (or effort) with which particular mental contents come to mind” 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2005, p. 271). Heuristics are of several kinds, and their effectiveness 
varies across contexts. In the present context, using intuition involves applying certain heuristics 
to an ITPM’s subjective sample of what can go wrong with each IT project scenario (Huff & 
Prybutok, 2008; Lyytinen et al., 1998). For example, to estimate how risky a project may be, an 
ITPM might use the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) by referring to his or her 
easily-retrievable knowledge of the number of recent occurrences of similar troublesome projects. 
 
 
We posit that project-specific expertise increases the relative estimation accuracy of 
intuition in two ways. First, low expertise involves possessing a small sample of relevant cause-
effects and thus immature intuition (Salas et al., 2010). In this case, deliberate analysis (e.g., 
using standard risk checklists) is likely to identify a wider array of pertinent risks. However, as 
ITPMs become experts, they develop a richer knowledge base about what will happen in each 
project scenario (Huff & Prybutok, 2008). Indeed, IS researchers have found that experts are not 
influenced by the use of risk assessment tools because they already possess relevant knowledge 
of the risk sources (Du et al., 2007). Second, low project-specific expertise involves not only 
lacking various heuristics that could be learned through experience or formal training but also 
inexperience with how to properly use the heuristics. However, experienced individuals know how 
to select relevant heuristics that they have accumulated through past risk encounters (Gigerenzer 
& Gaissmaier, 2011), especially by learning from their errors (Huff & Prybutok, 2008). 
We also posit that project-specific expertise increases the relative efficiency of intuition in 
two ways. First, heuristics are effort-reducing strategies (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008) because 
they seek accessible answers to difficult questions. With low expertise, the subjective sample is 
deficient; yet, high expertise increases the accessibility of answers since several related items of 
information will be available in the subjective sample. Second, with low project-specific expertise, 
selecting and using heuristics might still be effortful. However, with repeated practice, the use of 
heuristics becomes subconscious, contributing to a characterizing aspect of intuition, i.e., 
automaticity (Dane & Pratt, 2007).  
Proposition 5: Project-specific expertise has a positive impact on the relative 
performance of intuition compared to deliberate analysis for risk 
assessment. 
We also posit that the effect of the other antecedents of the relative performance of intuition 
compared to deliberate analysis is influenced by project-specific expertise. Thus, we postulate: 
 
 
Proposition 6: Project-specific expertise moderates the effect of risks’ temporal 
complexity, risks’ structural complexity, project stakeholders’ 
involvement, and methods-using pressures on the relative 
performance of intuition compared to deliberate analysis for risk 
assessment.  
More precisely, without expertise, ITPMs might not be familiar with the possible emergent 
risks or sense the imminence of risk events. Consequently, the pattern recognition mechanism of 
intuition is less likely to identify such risks, leading to a weaker relative performance of intuition 
than deliberate analysis. With project-specific expertise, however, intuition is sensitized to identify 
emerging risks, and it works more automatically. 
Proposition 6a:  Project-specific expertise of ITPMs moderates the positive effect of 
risks’ temporal complexity on the relative performance of intuition 
compared to deliberate analysis for risk assessment.  
We suggest that the impact of project risks’ structural complexity on the relative 
performance of intuition depends on project-specific expertise. When project managers lack 
expertise, their intuition is immature (Salas et al., 2010), especially when they do not possess the 
subjective sample required to perform the pattern recognition that can deal with complex project 
risks in a rapid manner. However, “in practice, experienced project managers of complex and 
uncertain software projects may rely more on their expert knowledge and judgment than on [the] 
prescribed rational frameworks” (Taylor, 2007, p. 2). 
Proposition 6b:  Project-specific expertise of ITPMs moderates the positive effect of 
risks’ structural complexity on the relative performance of intuition 
compared to deliberate analysis for risk assessment.  
We further posit that the negative impact of project stakeholders’ involvement on the relative 
performance of intuition is weakened by ITPMs’ project-specific expertise. Project-specific 
expertise improves ITPMs’ communication of their intuition in two ways. First, for a risk message 
to be effective, the credibility of the message source is crucial (Williams & Noyes, 2007). Having 
high project-specific expertise can bring such credibility to ITPMs because expertise is among the 
strongest correlates of project managers’ perceived effectiveness ratings (Thamhain & Gemmill, 
 
 
1974). Second, with high expertise, managers develop various tactics for communicating their 
intuition, for example, by co-promoting their intuitive judgements in meetings (Constantiou, Shollo, 
& Vendel, 2016).  
Proposition 6c:  Project-specific expertise of ITPMs moderates the negative effect of 
project stakeholders’ involvement on the relative performance of 
intuition compared to deliberate analysis for risk assessment.  
We also posit that the negative impact of methods-using pressures on the relative 
performance of intuition is weakened by ITPMs’ project-specific expertise. Often, project 
managers lack formal authority and use other bases of influence. High project-specific expertise 
leads to having expert power, which “refers to the ability of a project manager to get those with 
whom he interfaces to do what he wants them to do because they attribute greater knowledge to 
him or believe he is more 'qualified' to evaluate the consequences of certain projects” (Wilemon 
& Gemmill, 1971, p. 323). As such, with significant expertise, an ITPM can circumvent the existing 
power structures in an organization, and intuition does not lose its relative action impetus as much 
as it would for a novice ITPM.  
Proposition 6d:  Project-specific expertise of ITPMs moderates the negative effect of 
methods-using pressures on the relative performance of intuition 
compared to deliberate analysis for risk assessment.  
6. Discussion  
6.1 Implications for Research and Practice 
The new bridging knowledge ensuing from the proposed theoretical model opens several avenues 
for future prescriptive research and has practical implications.   
When intuition outperforms deliberate analysis, researchers can derive more explicit 
prescriptions from the experiential knowledge of ITPMs. First, teaching materials can be designed 
to encourage ITPMs to acknowledge their intuitions. Some ways to do so are to invite ITPMs to 
pay attention to the early warning signs they notice (Thamhain, 2013); to document their intuitions 
before starting deliberate analysis, for example, using risk checklists (Baskerville & Stage, 1996); 
 
 
and not to simply disregard intuitions if the output of the tool has suggested a different estimate 
(Drummond, 1996). Second, ITPMs’ intuition can be improved by enhancing the heuristics they 
use. For instance, EUT prescribes the use of risk exposure to prioritize risk sources. Yet, to 
complement this, other heuristics such as fluency (i.e., prioritizing the most salient risk sources 
that come to mind) and tallying (i.e., counting the number of reasons each risk source might cause 
undesired events and prioritizing the risk sources with the highest count) (Gigerenzer, 2008) could 
be further validated and promoted when designing risk assessment techniques or training 
programs. Third, guidelines can be developed to help ITPMs reduce the biases of their heuristics 
in terms of the risk sources identified and the risk level estimated. In the design of risk assessment 
training programs, it could be relevant to include a learning outcome about increasing the ITPMs’ 
self-awareness regarding the ways in which intuition can be used with reduced bias.  
When deliberate analysis outperforms intuition, researchers can design interventions to 
encourage ITPMs to rely more on normative knowledge. Researchers can design tools that 
screen ITPMs based on the contingencies under which deliberate analysis outperforms intuition; 
and, if these conditions are met, they can encourage ITPMs to continue using the tools for risk 
assessment and to rely upon their output for risk response. In doing so, keeping in mind that it is 
essential to design interventions that correspond to managerial thinking (March & Shapira, 1987), 
risk assessment tools could be designed (e.g., using better data visualization) to focus attention 
on important aspects of information via formatting (Williams & Noyes, 2007), which would 
consider the usability issues with risk assessment tools (Taylor et al., 2012). While this would 
increase the practicality of these tools, it could also contribute to modifying the managerial 
perspective through training them to use normative prescriptions (March & Shapira, 1987).  
6.2 Limitations 
Our work has some limitations. First, we have studied risk response as an individual-level decision 
of ITPMs. Nonetheless, risk management is, at times, seen as a collective-level activity (Lim, Sia, 
 
 
& Yeow, 2011); thus, future studies at that level would be fruitful. Second, to create a balanced 
pool of papers, we reviewed some, but not all of the normative papers were identified. Although 
we reached saturation in our analysis, further research could explore the other papers for 
additional insights. Third, as with any similar exercise, our coding process might be deemed 
subjective. To address this issue, we attempted to make this process as coherent as possible by 
discussing various manifestations of each assumption and extracting the supporting excerpts. 
Nevertheless, other researchers might be able to articulate additional or even different underlying 
assumptions, for example, by grouping the manifestations into different assumptions during the 
axial and selective coding steps. Finally, we have assumed risk management to be purposeful by 
defining risk assessment performance as an activity that contributes to project success. However, 
ITPMs can use risk assessment for selective reporting (Iacovou, Thompson, & Smith, 2009) or 
for deliberate stakeholder deception (Kutsch & Hall, 2005), which we deemed out of the scope of 
experiential knowledge. Future research could explore those aspects.  
6.3 Contributions  
Notwithstanding these limitations, our study makes several contributions. First, we provide a 
foundation for future bridging research on IT project risk management by offering a model that 
reconciles two seemingly contrasting bodies of knowledge. Second, we unearth common 
conceptualizations and overarching process and variance models from the normative and 
experiential bodies of knowledge and we provide a set of conceptual assumptions specific to each 
stance. By doing so, we contribute to the ongoing discussion of the assumptions underlying the 
IT project risk management literature (e.g., de Bakker et al., 2010). Overall, we contribute to IT 
project risk management research programs (e.g., Sauer et al., 2008) by calling for more 
incorporation of the experiential phenomena of decision making into this stream of research. We 
try to stimulate interest in this relevant area by showcasing how a dialectical tension could be 
addressed by theorizing. 
 
 
Moreover, we make a methodological contribution by offering a three-step dialectical review 
approach. In particular, we contribute to the research on examining assumptions (e.g., Alvesson 
& Sandberg, 2011; Davis, 1971) by adapting the grounded theory literature review method 
(Wolfswinkel et al., 2013). In doing so, we propose and showcase that the dialectical interrogation 
mechanism of problematization can be implemented using the coding techniques of grounded 
theorizing. We suggest treating the papers as data, manifestations of their assumptions as open 
codes close to the data, and assumptions as higher-level (axial/selective) codes.  
7. Concluding Remarks  
Using a theme-based review, we delineated two bodies of knowledge—normative and 
behavioral—within the IT project risk management literature, and we synthesized what has been 
learned from each. Contrastation led us to identify several dialectical tensions between the 
assumptions of the two bodies of knowledge on key issues such as the relative importance of the 
probability and impact dimensions of risk exposure and the relative importance of various 
determinants to be considered for a risk response decision. Given that risk assessment is often a 
key basis for any risk response action, one tension appeared particularly relevant, that of the 
relative performance of intuition compared to deliberate analysis. We addressed this tension in 
the sublation step of our study. To do this, we adopted one of Poole and Van de Ven’s (1989) 
recommendations of building upon oppositions, tensions, and contradictions by finding a new 
perspective that could eliminate existing oppositions. We thus developed a theoretical model of 
the contingencies under which each approach can perform better. The model suggests that 
ITPMs’ project-specific expertise, risks’ temporal complexity, risks’ structural complexity, 
stakeholders’ involvement in risk management, and methods-using pressures explain the relative 
performance of intuition and deliberate analysis for risk assessment. Moreover, the model 
suggests that project-specific expertise plays a key role by moderating all the other proposed 
effects. Given the applied nature of risk management research, we discuss several avenues for 
 
 
developing future prescriptive research, and we suggest testing the model as a key step in this 
direction. 
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9. Appendices  
Appendix A: Coding Scheme for Research Objectives 
Guided by our understanding of the two bodies of knowledge, and to create a manageable but 
balanced pool of papers, we coded the papers on the basis of their key research objective as 
pertaining to chiefly normative or experiential knowledge. If a paper has both objectives at the 
same time or the objectives cannot be separated, we coded the paper as mixed. The table below 
presents our coding scheme. 
Body of Knowledge Normative  Experiential  
Theme 
Focus 
Overarching Questions Overarching Questions 
• How to further build on and advance 
decision-theoretic knowledge in 
order to have higher chances of 
project success?  
• Are the resulting prescriptions 
indeed effective? Why? 
• How do ITPMs actually manage 
project risks in practice?  
• Are these behaviors different from the 
prescriptions derived from normative 
knowledge? Why? 
Specific Questions Specific Questions 
Core 
Constructs 
Risk  
How to conceptualize project risks 
according to the classical decision 
theories? 
How do ITPMs conceptualize and 
perceive risks?  
What are the key specific risk sources 
and events? 
What are the key risk sources and 
events that ITPMs see in IT projects? 
How do they differ from the ones in the 
literature? 
How should risks be assessed? 
 
How and why do ITPMs’ perceptions of 
risks differ from that of other entities 
(e.g., other stakeholders)?  
Risk 
Response 
What are the key risk responses that 
should be enacted to cope which each 
specific risk source or event?  
What are the key risk responses that 
ITPMs actually use (or do not use) in IT 
projects?  
How should appropriate risk responses 
be selected for specific risks? 
How and why are the decisions to 
whether or not enact these responses 
different from normative prescriptions? 
Research 
Models 
Process 
Models 
What are the key formal steps that 
should be taken in project risk 
management? 
What are the steps that ITPMs actually 
take when managing risks?  
How and why does applying formal 
risk management processes influence 
project success? 
How and why ITPMs disengage from 
applying risk management practices? 
Variance 
Models  
What constitutes a risk with a negative 
impact on project success? 
What influences ITPMs risk 
perceptions? 
 
What determines a good risk 
response? 
What influences ITPMs risk response 
enactment? 
What is the impact of applying formal 
risk management processes on project 
success? 
What motivates ITPMs to apply (or 
disengage from applying) formal risk 
management practices? 
 
 
Appendix B: Details on the Investigated Papers 
Study Journal 
Citation 
Count  
(Oct 2016) 
Studies with a Research Objective Pertaining to Normative Knowledge 
Barki et al. (1993) Journal of Management Information Systems 811 
Barki et al. (2001) Journal of Management Information Systems 447 
Baskerville and Stage (1996) MIS Quarterly 159 
Boehm (1991) IEEE Software 1831 
Ehie and Madsen (2005) Computers in Industry 415 
Fairley (1994) IEEE Software 235 
Gemino et al. (2008) Journal of Management Information Systems 112 
Han and Huang (2007) Journal of Systems and Software 206 
Heemstra and Kusters (1996) Journal of Information Technology 89 
Huang et al. (2004) Industrial Management & Data Systems 243 
Jiang and Klein (1999) Information & Management 184 
Jiang and Klein (2000) Journal of Systems and Software 216 
Jiang et al. (2006) Journal of the Association for Information Systems 92 
Keil et al. (1998) Communications of the ACM 831 
Lyytinen et al. (1996) Journal of Information Technology 106 
Mursu et al. (2003) European Journal of Information Systems 57 
Nidumolu (1995) Information Systems Research 538 
Nidumolu (1996) Journal of Management Information Systems 219 
Powell and Klein (1996) Journal of Information Technology 61 
Saarinen and Vepsäläinen (1993) European Journal of Information Systems 37 
Schmidt et al. (2001) Journal of Management Information Systems 1092 
Scott and Vessey (2002) Communications of the ACM 414 
Sherer and Alter (2004) Communications of the AIS 123 
Sumner (2000) Journal of Information Technology 631 
Tesch et al. (2007) Journal of Computer Information Systems 125 
Wallace and Keil (2004) Communications of the ACM 322 
Wallace et al. (2004a) Decision Sciences 425 
Wallace et al. (2004b) Information & Management 392 
Whittaker (1999) Information Management & Computer Security 286 
Willcocks and Margetts (1994) European Journal of Information Systems 169 
Yetton et al. (2000) Information Systems Journal 144 
Average Citations of Studies with a Normative Research Objective 355.2 
Studies with a Mixed Research Objective 
Addison and Vallabh (2002) Other - Conference Proceedings - SAICSIT 2002 145 
Armour (2005) Communications of the ACM 23 
Baccarini et al. (2004) Industrial Management & Data Systems 229 
Bannerman (2008) Journal of Systems and Software 273 
Bussen and Myers (1997) Journal of Information Technology 106 
Charette (1996b) IEEE Software 112 
Charette (1996a) Journal of Information Technology 64 
Charette (2005) IEEE Spectrum 272 
de Bakker et al. (2010) International Journal of Project Management 213 
de Bakker et al. (2011) Project Management Journal 31 
de Bakker et al. (2012) International Journal of Project Management 36 
Lyytinen and Robey (1999) Information Systems Journal 438 
Lyytinen et al. (1998) Information Systems Research 358 
McGrew and Bilotta (2000) Management Decision 37 
 
 
Ropponen and Lyytinen (1997) European Journal of Information Systems 99 
Ropponen and Lyytinen (2000) IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 396 
Smith et al. (2001) Communications of the AIS 48 
Williams et al. (1997) IEEE Software 83 
Average Citations of Studies with a Mixed Research Objective 164.6 
Studies with a Research Objective Pertaining to Experiential Knowledge 
Carr (1997) IEEE Software 23 
Drummond (1996) Journal of Information Technology 88 
Du et al. (2007) Decision Support Systems 55 
Gemmer (1997) IEEE Software 76 
Glass (1999) Communications of the ACM 87 
Huff and Prybutok (2008) Project Management Journal 23 
Jani (2011) International Journal of Project Management 46 
Keil et al. (2000) Journal of Systems and Software 139 
Keil et al. (2002) Information Systems Journal 209 
Keil et al. (2008) Journal of Systems and Software 71 
Kutsch and Hall (2005) International Journal of Project Management 95 
Kutsch and Hall (2009) Project Management Journal 34 
Kutsch and Hall (2010) International Journal of Project Management 129 
Kutsch and Maylor (2011) International Journal of Project Organisation and Mgmt. 3 
Kutsch et al. (2013) European Journal of Information Systems 11 
Kutsch et al. (2014) Research-Technology Management 9 
Lauer (1996) Journal of Information Technology 22 
Lim et al. (2011) Journal of the Association for Information Systems 15 
Liu et al. (2010) Information Systems Journal 69 
Mignerat and Rivard (2012) Information and Organization 21 
Moynihan (1996) Journal of Information Technology 85 
Moynihan (1997) IEEE Software 159 
Moynihan (2000) Journal of Systems and Software 28 
Moynihan (2002) Information & Management 31 
Pablo (1999) Journal of Managerial Psychology 53 
Pfleeger (2000) Journal of Systems and Software 79 
Ropponen (1999) Other - Book Chapter 25 
Taylor (2005) International Journal of Project Management 27 
Taylor (2006) Project Management Journal 36 
Taylor (2007) Other - Conference Proceedings - ICIS 2007  5 
Taylor et al. (2012) Journal of Information Technology 33 
Average Citations of Studies with an Experiential Research Objective 57.6 
 
  
 
 
Appendix C: Synthesis of the Normative and Experiential Bodies of 
Knowledge  
Here we provide more details on our synthesis of the process and variance theories from the 
normative and experiential knowledge bases. 
Table C1 Normative Knowledge – The Formal Risk Management Process 
Study 
Risk Assessment Risk Control 
S7- 
Process 
Iteration 
S1- Risk 
Identification 
S2- Risk 
Analysis 
S3- Risk 
Prioritization 
S4- Risk 
Response 
Planning 
S5- Risk 
Response 
Enactment 
S6-Risk 
Monitoring  
Addison and Vallabh (2002) X X  X   X 
Baccarini et al. (2004) X X  X  X  
Bannerman (2008) X X  X  X X 
Baskerville and Stage (1996) X X X X   X 
Boehm (1991) X X X X  X X 
Charette (1996a) X X  X X X X 
de Bakker et al. (2010)       X 
de Bakker et al. (2011) X X  X X X X 
de Bakker et al. (2012) X X  X    
Du et al. (2007) X   X    
Fairley (1994) X X  X  X X 
Heemstra and Kusters (1996) X X X X   X 
Jani (2011) X X      
Keil et al. (2008) X   X    
Kutsch and Hall (2009) X X  X  X  
Kutsch et al. (2014) X X X X    
Lim et al. (2011) X X  X   X 
Lyytinen et al. (1998) X X  X   X 
Mignerat and Rivard (2012) X X X   X  
Powell and Klein (1996) X X      
Ropponen (1999) X X  X    
Smith et al. (2001) X X  X   X 
Taylor (2007) X X X X    
Tesch et al. (2007) X X  X  X  
Williams et al. (1997)       X 
 
Other steps not included in this table but mentioned by a few studies are:  
• a risk management planning (initiation) step mentioned by Baccarini et al. (2004), 
de Bakker et al. (2012), Kutsch and Hall (2009), and Tesch et al. (2007); 
• a risk categorization step after risk identification as proposed by Jani (2011) and 
Powell and Klein (1996); 
• a contingency planning step (separate from risk response planning) as discussed 
by Bannerman (2008) and Fairley (1994);  
• a crisis management step suggested by Fairley (1994); and 
• a separate risk communication and reporting step as recommended by Baccarini et 
al. (2004), Bannerman (2008), Boehm (1991), de Bakker et al. (2011), de Bakker et 
al. (2012), and Kutsch and Hall (2005). 
 
 
 
Table C2 – Normative Knowledge – Variance Studies 
Relationship Study 
Quantitative/ 
Qualitative/ 
Conceptual 
Quantitative 
Findings  
Comment 
R1 
Risk  Project 
performance -
Direct effect 
Charette 
(2005) 
Conceptual - Unmanaged risks lead to project failure. 
Ehie and 
Madsen 
(2005) 
Quantitative Mixed “There was a strong correlation between 
successfully implementing ERP and six out of 
the eight factors identiﬁed.” (p. 545) 
Gemino et al. 
(2008) 
Quantitative Mixed Emergent risk factors influence only the project 
process performance not the product 
performance. 
Han and 
Huang (2007) 
Quantitative Mixed Different risk factors influence high, medium, and 
low-performance software projects 
Jiang & Klein 
(1999) 
Quantitative Mixed “the various project risk variables are not equally 
important in influencing system success” (p. 268) 
Jiang and 
Klein (2000) 
Quantitative Mixed Some specific risks had an effect, but “The 
remaining risk factors did not relate to the overall 
measure of effectiveness.” (p. 7) 
Nidumolu 
(1996) 
Quantitative Mixed See p. 99. The effect of requirement uncertainty 
on performance (process) is significant but on 
performance (product) is insignificant. 
Risk  Project 
performance -
Mediated effect 
through 
intermediary risks  
Gemino et al. 
(2008) 
Quantitative Mixed “emergent risk factors cannot be, or are not 
currently, completely mitigated by project 
management practice.” (p. 32) [partial mediation] 
Jiang et al. 
(2006) 
Quantitative Supported “(Residual performance risk) [was included] as 
an intermediate variable that was significantly 
related with project performance” (p. 81) 
Nidumolu 
(1995) 
Quantitative Supported “project uncertainty increased residual 
performance risk and reduced project 
performance” (p. 209) 
Nidumolu 
(1996) 
Quantitative Supported See p. 102. The effect of requirements 
uncertainty on software performance risk is 
significant. 
Bannerman 
(2008) 
Conceptual - See p. 2120. The influence of risk is mediated 
through vulnerabilities of the organization. 
Wallace et al. 
(2004a) 
Quantitative Supported See p. 304. Project management risk mediates 
social subsystem risk but not technical 
subsystem risk. 
R2 Fit  Project 
Performance 
Barki et al. 
(2001) 
Quantitative  Supported Supported. 
R3 Risk responses 
 Project 
performance - 
Contingent effect  
Barki et al. 
(2001) 
Quantitative Supported “deviations from an ideal Risk Management 
Profile were negatively correlated with 
Performance” (p. 54) 
Risk responses 
 Project 
performance - 
Direct effect 
Gemino et al. 
(2008) 
Quantitative Supported “project management practices are signiﬁcantly 
directly related to process and product 
performance.” (p. 34) 
Jiang et al. 
(2006) 
Quantitative Supported “partnering significantly relates to higher user 
support, less residual risk” (p. 68) 
Nidumolu 
(1995) 
Quantitative Supported “higher levels of both vertical and horizontal 
coordination lead to higher levels of overall 
performance.” (p. 191) 
Nidumolu 
(1996) 
Quantitative Mixed The effect of vertical coordination on 
performance is insignificant, but that of 
horizontal coordination is significant. 
R4 Risk responses 
 Project 
performance – 
Mediate via 
Jiang et al. 
(2006) 
Quantitative Supported “partnering significantly relates to higher user 
support, less residual risk, and better project 
performance” (p. 68) 
Nidumolu Quantitative Supported “vertical coordination reduced residual 
 
 
residual risks 
 
(1995) performance risk, both directly and by reducing 
project uncertainty; consequently, it also 
significantly increased project performance, 
albeit indirectly” (p. 209) 
Risk responses 
 Residual risk  
Ropponen 
and Lyytinen 
(1997) 
Quantitative Mixed “little support was found for the claim that 
speciﬁc risk management methods are 
instrumental in attacking speciﬁc software risks.” 
(p. 41) 
Addison and 
Vallabh 
(2002) 
Quantitative Mixed “seven of the ten risk factors are reduced by the 
use of controls.” (p. 139)  
R5 Residual risk  
Project 
Performance 
Jiang et al. 
(2006) 
Quantitative Supported Supported. 
Nidumolu 
(1995) 
Quantitative Supported .H3 is supported. 
Nidumolu 
(1996) 
Quantitative Mixed The effect of risk on performance (process) is 
significant but on performance (product) is 
insignificant. 
R6 Formal risk 
management  
Project 
performance – 
Indirect effect via 
residual risk 
Ropponen 
and Lyytinen 
and (2000) 
Quantitative Mixed “general use of risk management methods” 
mitigates “requirements management risk” (p. 
103); “those who applied risk management 
methods continuously managed scheduling and 
timing risks significantly better” (p. 103) 
Formal risk 
management 
Project 
performance – 
Direct effect from 
the entire 
process  
Ropponen 
and Lyytinen 
(1997) 
Quantitative Supported “Our ﬁndings support in general the claim that 
the use of risk management methods improves 
system development performance.” (p. 41) 
Boehm (1991) Conceptual - - 
Formal risk 
management 
Project 
performance – 
Direct effect from 
different steps 
(e.g., risk 
identification) 
de Bakker et 
al. (2012) 
Qualitative - “risk identification and risk allocation are 
considered by stakeholders as contributing most 
often to project success […]. Other risk 
management activities contribute less often to 
project success […] except for risk management 
planning” (p. 451) 
McGrew and 
Bilotta (2000) 
Quantitative Supported In two projects, the “percent correct” of risk 
assessment and risk intervention is consistently 
more than 50%. 
de Bakker et 
al. (2011) 
Qualitative - “Analysis demonstrates stakeholders 
deliberately use risk management to convey 
messages to others […]. Stakeholders perceive 
these effects as contributing to project success.” 
(p. 75) 
de Bakker et 
al. (2012) 
Qualitative - “in addition to the instrumental effects of risk 
management, being direct risk mitigating actions 
by stakeholders, individual risk management 
activities are able to generate communicative 
effects.” (p. 444) 
Baskerville 
and Stage 
(1996) 
Qualitative - “the risk analysis technique succeeds as a 
helpful management tool, even though the 
project outcome may be failure.” (p. 497) 
Formal risk 
management  
Project 
performance – 
Mediated by way 
of application 
Williams et al. 
(1997) 
Conceptual - The paper discusses the effective vs. ineffective 
ways to implement risks. 
 
Gemmer 
(1997) 
Conceptual - The paper discusses functional vs. dysfunctional 
risk management behaviors. 
Formal risk 
management  
Ropponen 
and Lyytinen 
Quantitative Supported “risk management performance depends on 
several environmental contingencies. These 
 
 
Project 
performance – 
Moderated effect 
(1997) include the size of the IS department, the project 
size, project management training, project 
managers' experience, and the use of system 
development methods.” (p. 46) 
 
Table C3 Experiential Knowledge – Process Studies 
(Evidencing Risk Management Process Disengagement) 
Process 
Disengagement 
Stage 
Study 
Statistical/ 
Qualitative/ 
Conceptual 
Finding 
D0  From applying 
the risk 
management 
process 
Ropponen (1999) Quantitative “a large majority of project managers (62 observations = 
75%) did not follow any detailed risk management approach.” 
(p. 254) 
Fairly (1994) Conceptual “risk management is seldom applied as an explicit project-
management activity” (p. 57) 
Bannerman (2008)  Quantitative “Formal risk management was practiced in ﬁve projects 
(29%), no risk management was practiced at all in another 
ﬁve (29%), while the remaining seven projects (41%) adopted 
a range of semi-formal or informal practices.” (p. 2124) 
From a 
purposeful 
application 
(rather than for 
seeking 
legitimacy) 
Kutsch and Hall (2009) Quantitative “In over half of all cases, a PMI risk management process 
was used […]. However, in one-third of the 102 cases, no 
formal project risk management approach was applied.” (p. 
78) 
Mignerat and Rivard 
(2012) 
Conceptual “three groups of practices – formal control, external 
integration and project risk management – have reached full 
institutionalization.” (p. 126) 
D1 From risk 
identification  
Ropponen (1999). Quantitative “75% of the respondents used checklists” but only 33% used 
often (p. 254) 
D2 From risk analysis Ropponen (1999) Quantitative See p. 254. Risk exposure was used by 20% of ITPMs, but 
only 5% used often. 
de Bakker et al. (2012) Qualitative “Risk analysis was done in five of the seven projects.” (p. 
449) 
Baccarini et al. (2004) Conceptual “the OTR Group (1992) found that only 30 per cent of 
organisations applied risk analysis in their IT investment and 
project management processes.” 
Bannerman (2008) Qualitative “No agency reported using quantitative risk assessment.” (p. 
2125) 
Armour (2005) Conceptual “many organizations […] do not do an explicit risk 
calculation.” (p. 19) 
Taylor (2005) Qualitative “none of the respondents carried out any quantitative 
assessments.” (p. 441) 
Kutsch et al. (2013) Qualitative See p. 5. 
D3 From risk 
prioritization 
Bannerman (2008) Qualitative Respondents “were quite equivocal about how well the risks 
were prioritized” (p. 2124) 
D4 From risk 
response planning 
Kutsch and Hall 2005 Qualitative ITPMs might not enact responses to risks because of some 
intervening conditions including denying uncertainty, avoiding 
uncertainty, delaying uncertainty, and ignoring uncertainty. 
Kutsch and Hall 2010 Qualitative ITPMs might chose to deliberately ignore risks rather than 
enacting responses to them. 
Kutsch et al. (2014)  Quantitative “28 percent (44 risks) of the risks that made it through the 
earlier stages were not actively managed, even though 
managers had already invested effort in identifying and 
assessing them.” (p. 28) 
de Bakker et al. (2012) Quantitative “Risk control is mentioned in six cases [out of seven]” (p. 
449) 
D5 From risk 
response 
enactment 
Taylor (2005) Qualitative “The hand-over from pre-sales to implementation teams was 
often a weak link, with project managers failing to follow-up 
risk management plans prepared at pre-sales stage.” (p. 437) 
 
 
D6 From risk 
monitoring  
Taylor (2005) Qualitative “respondents did not appear to use the pre-sales risk 
assessment to warn them about speciﬁc potential problems 
that they should watch out for.” (p. 441) 
D7 From iterating the 
process over the 
course of the 
project 
 
Bannerman (2008) Qualitative “project management practices tended to wane as the project 
progressed” (p. 2124); “risk management practice was often 
not sustained throughout the whole project” (p. 2131) 
Taylor (2005) Qualitative “Many of the respondents did not regard risk assessment as 
an on-going project activity.” (p. 442) 
Carr (1997)  Conceptual “for the most part risk identification and analysis is performed 
on an ad hoc basis, generally at the beginning of the project” 
(p. 24) 
de Bakker et al. (2010)  Conceptual “the sequence of identiﬁcation, analysis, responses, and 
monitoring is often not followed.” (p. 500) 
de Bakker et al. (2011) Qualitative “Project 2 did not follow the sequence of risk management 
practices” (p. 82) 
S1 Deliberate risk 
ignorance 
Kutsch and Hall (2005) Qualitative - 
Kutsch and Hall (2010) Qualitative - 
Kutsch et al. (2013) Qualitative - 
S2 Intuitive risk 
management 
Baskerville and Stage 
(1996) 
Qualitative - 
Drummond (1996) Qualitative - 
Ropponen (1999) Quantitative - 
 
Table C4 – Experiential Knowledge – Variance Studies 
Relationship Study Quantitative/ 
Qualitative/ 
Conceptual 
Finding if 
Quantitative 
Comment 
P1 Risk checklists 
 Risk 
perception - In 
terms of 
covered risks  
Lyytinen et al. 
(1998) 
Conceptual - Four different checklists shape ITPMs’ attention to 
differing risk factors. 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative Mixed Dual effects: Risk checklists helped novice ITPMs 
identify some risks but blinded them to other risks. 
Risk checklists 
 Risk 
perception - In 
terms of risk 
extent  
Keil et al. (2008) Quantitative Supported “the risk checklist helped subjects identify more 
risks than they would identify without the aid of a 
checklist” (p. 908) 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative Supported A significant but very small effect: “the effect of the 
risk assessment tool on risk perception [...] was 
small” (p. 277) 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative No Support “risk perceptions for experts were not influenced 
by use of the tool” (p. 279) 
Provided risk 
information  
Risk 
Perception 
Keil et al. (2000) Quantitative Supported Two provided information items are on the 
probability and magnitude of impact of risks.  
P2 Risk propensity 
 Risk 
perception 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative Supported See p. 276. 
Keil et al. (2008) Quantitative No Support “Contrary to our hypothesis, subjects who 
identiﬁed more risks were no more risk-averse 
than the subjects who identiﬁed fewer risks.” (p. 
914) 
Keil et al. (2000) Quantitative No Support See p. 151. 
Expertise  
Risk perception  
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative Mixed See p. 277 (novices vs. experts).  
Role  Risk 
perception 
Keil et al. (2008) Quantitative No Support See p. 913 (Inside ITPMs vs. outside consultants). 
Keil et al. (2002) Quantitative Supported ITPMs vs. users. 
 
 
Self-efficacy  
Risk perception 
Jani (2011) Quantitative Supported Task-specific self-efficacy (-) 
Cultural 
differences  
Risk perception 
– In terms of 
covered risks 
Ropponen (1999) Quantitative Supported - 
Liu et al. (2010) Quantitative Supported - 
Mursu et al. (2003) Quantitative Supported “When we compare the ranked list of factors in 
Nigeria with the earlier ranked lists of factors, 
some important differences emerge” (p. 187) 
Perceived 
control  Risk 
perception 
Jani (2011) Quantitative Supported Perceived control over risks - Exogenous risk (+) 
or endogenous risk (-) 
Schmidt et al. 2001 Quantitative Supported In terms of risk factor rankings, they find that 
“Perceived level of control relates clearly with 
cultural differences in individualism, power 
distance, and uncertainty avoidance.” (p. 24) 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative Supported See p. 278 (Perceived control over project - 
Internal vs. outsourced project) 
P3 Risk perception 
 Risk 
response 
 
Jani (2011,)  Quantitative Supported See p. 940. 
Keil et al. (2000) Quantitative Mixed See p. 151. 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative No Support “Surprisingly, however, the difference in risk 
perception does not translate into differences in 
subsequent decisions on how to continue a 
project.” (p. 280) 
Drummond (1996) Qualitative - The project was simply continued despite 
significant risks. 
P4 Risk checklists 
 Risk 
response – In 
terms of 
response type 
Lyytinen et al. 
(1998) 
Conceptual - Four different checklists shape ITPMs’ attention to 
differing risk responses. 
Risk checklists 
 Risk 
response – In 
terms of 
response 
enactment 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative Supported “the effect of the risk assessment tool on [...] 
decision-making behavior was small” (p. 277) 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative Mixed  “the effect of the risk assessment tool on 
decision-making behavior was significant for 
novices, but not for experts” (p. 277) 
P5 Risk propensity 
 Risk 
response 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative Supported See p. 276. 
Huff and Prybutok 
(2008) 
Quantitative Mixed See p. 40 (Supported for 2 scenarios and not 
supported for 1 scenario). 
Jani (2011)  Quantitative Mixed - 
Keil et al. (2000) Quantitative No Support See p. 151. 
Problem 
context  Risk 
response 
Lauer (1996) Quantitative Supported Gain or loss context 
Reference 
point  Risk 
response  
Lauer (1996) Quantitative Supported Initial project endowment 
Problem 
framing  Risk 
response 
Lauer (1996) Quantitative Supported Different representations of the same problem 
Expertise/ 
Experience  
Risk response 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative No Support See p. 277 (expertise: novice vs. expert). 
Huff and Prybutok 
(2008) 
Quantitative Mixed See p. 39 (Task-specific experience - Supported 
for 2 scenarios, not supported at 5% level for 1 
scenario). 
Huff and Prybutok 
(2008) 
Quantitative No Support See p. 39 (Total work experience). 
Role  Risk 
Response 
Keil et al. (2008) Quantitative No Support See p. 913 (Inside project manager vs. outside 
consultant). 
 
 
Perceived 
control over 
project  Risk 
Response 
Du et al. (2007) Quantitative Supported See p. 277 (Internal vs. outsourced projects). 
 
Appendix D: Initial Codes 
As the first step in identifying key assumptions, the initial codes were identified by searching for 
the terms “assume,” “assumption,” and “premise” in the pool of papers, reading the papers that 
discuss these assumptions, and converting relevant excerpts to initial open codes before creating 
the manifestations. This process was guided by a knowledge of influential papers on risk 
management assumptions outside the IS domain (e.g., March & Shapira, 1987). 
Initial Code 
Relevant 
Final 
Manifestation 
“IT project managers focus on a few factors and largely ignore others” (Taylor et al., 
2012, p. 19) 
A 
“Expected utility theory (EUT) […] provides the fundamental assumptions that 
underline project risk management: […] perfect information about all of the relevant 
variables in terms of both quantity and quality; […] perfect knowledge of the future 
consequences of each possible solution and their implications for the project” (Kutsch 
& Hall, 2009, pp. 73-74) 
A 
“The premise behind risk management within the context of IT-project management is 
that […] it is feasible to identify problems before they occur” (Heemstra & Kusters, 
1996, p. 333) 
A/not used 
“It is assumed that specific risks to a project can be identified, and that their probability 
and impact can be quantified.” (Taylor et al., 2012, p. 19) 
B 
“The assumption is that risk assessment tools will provide managers with more 
accurate perceptions of risk, thereby allowing them to make better informed decisions 
and ensuring more successful outcomes” (Du et al., 2007, pp. 269-270) 
A, B 
“The underpinning assumption is that projects are comparable in the sense that 
information about risks can be generalised and is used in future projects.” (de Bakker 
et al., 2010, p. 494) 
A, B 
“the assumption that the use of such devices will lead to more accurate risk 
perceptions that will, in turn, lead to more appropriate decisions regarding project 
initiation and continuation.” (Keil et al., 2000, p. 145) 
B, C 
“The evaluation approach assumes that known risk factors are used in the current 
project, contributing to the management of the project and as a result to positive 
project outcomes.” (de Bakker et al., 2010, p. 495) 
C 
“The recommendations also assume that project managers will, indeed, evaluate the 
probability and impact of each risk in order to develop a risk management plan.” 
(Taylor et al., 2012, p. 19) 
B, C 
“in practice, the likelihood of outcomes and their impacts tend to enter into managers’ 
calculations of risk independently, rather than as their products” (Bannerman, 2008, p. 
2119) 
F, H 
 
 
“They [ITPMs] also tend to prefer verbal characterizations of risk than probabilistic 
representations because they are skeptical that the broad dimensionality of risk can be 
reduced to a single number.” (Bannerman, 2008, p. 2119) 
F, H 
“though quantities may be involved in assessing the level of risk, there is little desire to 
reduce risk to a single construct of outcomes.” (Lyytinen et al., 1998, p. 235) 
F, H 
“managers follow a less precise calculus.” (Lyytinen et al., 1998, p. 235) F, H 
“Managers see risk in less precise ways.” (Bannerman, 2008, p. 2119) F, H 
“it is very difﬁcult in practice to estimate the probability of impact of many risk factors, 
especially in software projects.” (Bannerman, 2008, p. 2119) 
F, H 
“managers neither understand, nor care to use precise probability estimates: crude 
characterizations are used to exclude certain possibilities from the decision” (Lyytinen 
et al., 1998, p. 235) 
F, G 
“many of the risks in IT projects are not aleatoric in nature (they are not based on 
probability), but epistemic, which means that there is not enough information available 
to take a decision.” (de Bakker et al., 2010, p. 500) 
G 
 
  
 
 
Appendix E: Manifestations of the Assumptions 
Initial codes (see Appendix D) were purified and used as part of open coding; but when they did 
not fit the data, we created new open codes to stay close to the data. The open codes were later 
grouped into what we call “manifestations,” and these manifestations were then abstracted to 
create the assumptions in a bottom-up fashion. The tables below list these manifestations for 
each—normative and experiential—assumption and provide some explanations and examples 
from the literature. 
Table E1 - Manifestations of the Normative Assumption 
Manifestation Explanation and Example  
A- Deliberate 
analysis covers 
a wider range 
of relevant 
risks than 
intuition. 
In applying the classical decision theories such as expected utility theory (EUT), the 
normative body of knowledge builds on the notion of bounded rationality which 
suggests that “the actor has only incomplete information” (Simon, 1972, p. 163). As 
March (1978) notes, researchers have responded to bounded rationality by 
developing knowledge bases that store information from past experiences to create 
an intelligence that informs future decision making.  
 
We extracted 13 excerpts (from 11 papers) that have explicitly mentioned storing and 
retrieving risk information using such knowledge bases as a way of identifying more 
risks. For example, Wallace et al. (2004a, p. 307), discussing the instrument they 
have developed, suggest that “Practitioners can use the instrument to develop 
historical databases of the risks associated with different projects and their outcome. 
Compilation of this information could provide a means of assessing future projects”. 
Likewise, Schmidt et al. (2001, p. 8) argue that “With a risk factor checklist, project 
managers can avoid overlooking some risk factors”.  
 
Moreover, we found 25 excerpts (13 papers) that implicitly support this manifestation 
by focusing on using or developing risk lists to help researchers measure risks in 
specific projects and/or to help ITPMs measure risks. 
B- Using 
deliberate 
analysis 
increases the 
accuracy of risk 
estimates. 
We found 3 excerpts (from 3 papers) that explicitly mention the higher accuracy of 
analytical estimates. Keil et al. (2000) explicitly point to the existence of this 
manifestation in the literature: 
To help managers appraise project risk more accurately, IS researchers have 
developed a variety of risk assessment tools including checklists and surveys. 
Implicit in this line of research, however, is the assumption that the use of such 
devices will lead to more accurate risk perceptions. (p. 145) 
For example, Charette (1996a, p. 375) states that “A key element to the accuracy 
(and precision) of the estimates will be whether there exists historical data to draw 
upon – the quality of the whole analysis process depends on the quality of the data”.  
 
We coded 13 excerpts (9 papers) that refer to the biases of intuition (i.e., systematic 
deviations from perfect identification of risk sources and evaluation of risk exposure, 
e.g., those performed by impartial risk experts who have perfect knowledge of 
outcome distribution and follow a prescribed calculus). For example, Jani (2011) 
states: 
Results of this study point to a ‘self-efficacy bias’ where project managers with 
higher self-efficacy may underestimate the risks of a troubled IT project as 
 
 
compared to project managers with lower self-efficacy. (p. 934) 
 
We also found an additional 35 excerpts (from 21 papers) that implicitly support this 
manifestation by discussing how to estimate risks analytically, considering that 
decision makers may approximate the information about the decision outcomes 
(March, 1978). For example, first the range of possible undesired outcomes is 
approximated by a list of risk sources. Then, the probability of overall undesired 
outcomes is approximated by either counting the number of present risk sources (e.g., 
Keil et al., 2008) or by rating the strength of each risk source and then aggregating 
these strengths using statistical methods (e.g., Wallace et al., 2004b). We also note 
that this approach has been not only prescribed but also used in research. For 
instance, to measure risk (i.e., the probability of an undesired outcome) or risk 
exposure (i.e., probability and magnitude of undesired outcomes), several researchers 
(e.g. Barki et al., 2001) have used proxy measures (e.g., a formative index of risk 
sources) rather than direct reflective indicators (e.g., a risk perception scale).  
C- Deliberate 
analysis is a 
better motivator 
for proper risk 
response 
enactment than 
intuition. 
We found nine excerpts (from 8 papers) mentioning that analysis is the proper basis 
for decision making. For example, Heemstra and Kusters (1996) suggest that 
The insight into the project which is required for proper risk management to take 
place can be enhanced if unambiguous data on this project and comparable 
previous projects are available. For this reason, we based the risk management 
method on the use of a checklist. (p. 336) 
 
We also identified five excerpts (from 4 papers) remarking that intuition is unreliable 
for decision making. For example, Taylor (2007, p. 15) finds that “the greater reliance 
on naturalistic, rather than strictly rational approaches, may contribute to poor project 
performance”. More explicitly, Gemmer (1997, p. 40) suggests that “The quality of 
decisions based on intuitive estimates (guesses) may be worse than making decisions 
without them”.  
D- Deliberate 
analysis 
reduces the 
required 
information 
processing 
efforts. 
We extracted one excerpt that explicitly mentioned that analytical methods help with 
simplifying and reducing the efforts required for information processing in one excerpt: 
“assessors frequently find it easier to conceptualize a risk in terms of two measures: 
the probability that the risk will occur, and the impact of the risk if it does occur” 
(Powell & Klein, 1996, p. 317). 
 
Moreover, we coded 25 excerpts (from 13 papers) that implicitly support this 
manifestation by referring to the use of risk lists, which provide a heuristic to identify 
risks (e.g., in Lyytinen et al., 1998) and thus facilitate and standardize how risks are 
identified.  
 
Similarly, we identified 35 excerpts (from 21 papers) that provide an implicit support 
for this manifestation by discussing the notion of risk exposure, which standardizes 
the way in which multiple pieces of risk information are combined into one value. In 
particular, Boehm (1991, p. 33) defines risk exposure as “RE = P(UO) * L(UO)”, with 
RE being risk exposure, P(UO) probability of an undesired outcome, and L(UO) the 
loss due to the undesired outcome. Boehm’s definition is cited by several researchers, 
including Barki et al. (2001, p. 43), who refer to the probability of “an unsatisfactory 
outcome” and define risk exposure as “this probability multiplied by the loss potential 
of the unsatisfactory outcome”.  
 
  
 
 
Table E2 - Manifestations of the Experiential Assumption 
Manifestation Explanation and Examples  
E- Intuition 
covers a wider 
range of 
relevant risks 
than deliberate 
analysis using 
normative 
prescriptions. 
We found two explicit excerpts (from 2 papers) arguing or evidencing that risk 
assessment tools do not identify as many relevant risks as intuition does. For 
example, Moynihan (1996, p. 359) finds that in identifying risk sources, his 
respondents “include some situational characteristics not addressed in this literature”.  
 
Moreover, we found 8 excerpts (from 7 papers) that refer to the narrow coverage span 
of risk lists. For example, in discussing the low-expertise ITPMs’ use of risk 
assessment tools, Du et al. (2007, p. 279) suggest that the tool “made them overlook 
risks not captured by the tool, hence creating blind spots in their holistic project level 
risk assessments”.  
F- Intuition 
provides more 
realistic risk 
estimates than 
deliberate 
analysis using 
normative 
prescriptions. 
We coded five excerpts (from 5 papers) explicitly mentioning that the ostensible rigor 
of risk assessment tools and techniques conveys a false sense of precision. For 
example, Drummond (1996, pp. 350-351) suggests that “The greater the rigour, the 
greater the impression of certainty where none basically exists”.  
 
We also found two excerpts (from 2 papers) explicitly referring to the biases in the 
output of risk assessment tools. For example, Bannerman (2008, p. 2120) discusses 
“the prospect that risk assessment based on published checklists may be biased 
and/or limited in scope”. 
 
Relatedly, we extracted three excerpts (from 3 papers) mentioning that a disbelief in 
quantitative risk estimates has led ITPMs not to use the methods that generate them. 
For example, Taylor (2005, p. 441) compares the risk assessment behavior of her 
respondents and the normative prescriptions and suggests that “while further 
quantitative risk analysis on any high risk items is a recommended approach […], 
none of the respondents carried out any quantitative assessments”.  
G- Intuition is 
more conducive 
to proper risk 
response 
enactment than 
deliberate 
analysis using 
normative 
prescriptions. 
We identified four excerpts (in 4 papers) explicitly suggesting that ITPMs rely more on 
intuition than deliberate analysis. For examples, Ropponen (1999, p. 256) suggests: 
“Most managers seem to be managing projects based on their past experience, 
following ‘gut feeling’ and hoping for ‘good luck’”.  
 
We also found five excerpts (in 5 papers) that explicitly mention that ITPMs analytical 
risk assessments techniques do not motivate action and are performed only in a 
decoupled fashion. For example, Drummond (1996) states that 
In theory, analysis informs decision making (e.g., Drummond, 1991). In practice, 
its role is largely symbolic. Analysis legitimates decisions by creating an 
impression of diligence whilst the assumptions upon which it is based are 
unverifiable […]. (p. 351) 
Likewise, Mignerat and Rivard (2012) discuss that 
If IS project managers do not actually enact the practices they claim they do 
use, this would mean that they adopt an avoidance strategy, which has been 
widely acknowledged as a response to institutionalized pressures […] This 
would be the case of an IS project manager who develops precise project plans 
or conducts detailed risk management evaluations, without actually using them 
over the course of the project. (p. 148) 
H- Intuition is 
less effortful 
than deliberate 
analysis using 
normative 
prescriptions. 
The behavioral decision-making literature suggests that while the use of methods 
takes time and effort, intuition is “fast” and “frugal” (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011) 
because it uses only part of the available information and ignores the rest (Shah & 
Oppenheimer, 2008). Intuition is used not only for gathering risk information, but also 
for processing it, which allows for handling complex situations through simultaneous 
evaluation of several pieces of information (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). It thus 
enables thinking about a range of probable undesired outcomes rather than just one 
 
 
salient outcome, such as project failure, as considered in many risk management 
studies (e.g., Barki et al., 2001).  
 
We extracted three excerpts (from 3 papers) explicitly referring to the effortfulness of 
deliberate analysis. For example, referring to a specific risk list in the literature, Lim et 
al. (2011) argue that 
Such a lengthy list is unwieldy, and it limits the efficacy of a “checklist-based” 
risk management approach. (p. 415) 
 
We also found three excerpts (in 3 papers) reporting on behaviors that imply that for 
ITPMs do not prefer to analyze risks using the normative methods. For example, 
Taylor (2005) suggests that her respondents did not decompose risks into different 
dimensions: 
The responses to the risk questions rarely took the form of an explicit estimate 
of impact and probability for a risk item. Instead, potential problems were 
usually assessed either on a yes/no basis indicating whether or not they 
applied, or with an estimate of whether the risk was a low, medium or high item 
with no differentiation between size of impact and likelihood of occurrence. (p. 
439) 
 
 
